



Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

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*Daniel Aaronson, Daniel Hartley,
and Bhashkar Mazumder*

REVISED
February 2019

WP 2017-12

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The Effects of the 1930s HOLC “Redlining” Maps*

Daniel Aaronson
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
daaronson@frbchi.org

Daniel Hartley
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
daniel.a.hartley@chi.frb.org

Bhashkar Mazumder
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
bhash.mazumder@gmail.com

February 2019

Abstract: We study the effects of the 1930s-era HOLC “redlining” maps on the long-run trajectories of neighborhoods. Using a boundary design along with propensity score methods, we estimate the causal effects of the maps on racial segregation, home ownership, house values, rents, and credit scores. We also compare cities on either side of a population cutoff that determined whether maps were drawn for identification. Our results suggest that the HOLC maps had an economically meaningful and lasting effect on the development of urban neighborhoods through reduced credit access and subsequent disinvestment.

*The authors thank participants at the spring 2016 Federal Reserve System Meeting on Applied Microeconomics, fall 2016 Federal Reserve System Meeting on Regional Economics, DePaul University, UIC, Marquette University, Vanderbilt University, University of Pittsburgh, University of Bergen, University of North Carolina, the Cleveland Fed, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, the Minneapolis Fed, the Philadelphia Fed, the NBER DAE meetings, University of Chicago Law School, University of Edinburgh, University of Essex, the University of Sussex, UCL, Cambridge, and the Policy History Meetings. We also thank Leah Boustan, Bill Collins, Price Fishback, Ben Keys, Jeff Lin, Raven Molloy, Derek Neal, Allison Shertzer, Tate Twinam, Randall Walsh, James Greer and Ladale Winling for helpful comments. We are especially grateful to Leah Plachinski and Joey Reiff for outstanding research assistance, The Digital Scholarship Lab at the University of Richmond for the digitized HOLC maps, both the Digital Scholarship Lab and Price Fishback for the Area Description Files, and Jonathan Rose for the Baltimore mortgage data. The views expressed here do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal Reserve System.

Introduction

Social scientists have long been interested in the link between place and socioeconomic success. With better data and more convincing sources of identification, there is now a greater recognition that where you grow up may causally affect academic performance, earnings, economic mobility, health, and longevity (e.g. Ludwig et al 2013; Chetty et al 2014, 2016a, 2016b; Reardon, Kalogrides, and Shores 2016). Moreover, striking racial differences in these same outcomes have been the basis of a large literature examining the role of residential segregation in explaining geographic disparities (e.g. Cutler and Glaeser 1997; Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor 1999; Ananat 2007; Boustan 2011; Chetty and Hendren 2017). This paper focuses on credit access, a potentially important channel that could drive both place- and race-based disparities, particularly with respect to wealth where the black-white gap is enormous (Dettling et al. 2017).

In the aftermath of the Great Depression, the Federal Government undertook dramatic reforms to limit foreclosures and stabilize the housing market. One seemingly innocuous initiative was the overhaul of property appraisal practices. The Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC), a now-defunct federal agency, drew maps for over 200 cities to document the relative riskiness of lending across neighborhoods. Neighborhoods were classified based on detailed risk-based characteristics, including housing age, quality, occupancy, and prices. However, non-housing attributes such as race, ethnicity, and immigration status were influential factors as well. Since the lowest rated neighborhoods were drawn in red and often had the vast majority of African American residents, these maps have been associated with the so-called practice of “redlining” in which borrowers are denied access to credit due to the demographic composition of their neighborhood. However, credit was also potentially restricted to neighborhoods scoring in the next lowest neighborhood grade marked in yellow, which has received much less public and academic attention. To complement the narrative history, we provide novel archival evidence from pre-WWII Baltimore showing a drop in private lending and FHA mortgage insurance in low-graded neighborhoods after the creation of that city’s HOLC map.

A voluminous literature studies the channels through which restricted access to credit can limit economic opportunities.¹ In total, that work makes a compelling case that policies that improperly restrict credit are potentially objectionable on the grounds of both equity and efficiency. Moreover, entire neighborhoods that are inappropriately deprived of credit could suffer from insufficient investment and become further magnets for an array of social problems related to poverty.

Our study attempts to estimate the causal effects of the HOLC maps on neighborhood development across the urban U.S. We merge 149 geocoded city maps digitized by the Digital Scholarship Lab at the University of Richmond with (a) address level data from the 100 percent count of the 1910 to 1940 U.S. decennial Censuses (Minnesota Population Center and Ancestry.com 2013), (b) census tract-level data from the 1950 to 1980 Censuses, and (c) block- and block group-level data from the 1990 to 2010 Censuses. This combination results in a century of data on neighborhood characteristics including race, homeownership, house values, rents, and population. We further merge block-level data on Equifax Risk Scores™ (credit scores) from the 1999 to 2016 Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax (CCP).

Since our analysis is non-experimental, our methodology must address confounding factors for valid inference. A key concern is that the maps may have simply reflected and codified pre-existing differences in neighborhoods but didn't actually *cause* any changes in credit access. We address this concern through a multi-pronged approach. We begin by considering changes over time in the difference in outcomes between neighbors that live on either side of an HOLC boundary within a tightly defined geographic band, typically a few city blocks. Comparisons of spatially proximate neighbors address some confounding factors like access to labor markets, public transportation, or other local amenities that might differentially influence neighborhood growth. However, a border design on its own is insufficient since, as we document, there were pre-existing differences and differential trends even among nearby neighbors.

¹ A small sampling includes Cameron and Taber (2004) on skill investment, Black and Strahan (2002) on entrepreneurship, Carroll (2001) on consumption, and Breza and Kinnan (2017) on economic activity.

To address this problem, our main strategy compares “treated” boundaries with a set of comparison boundaries using propensity score weighting. The weighting ensures that the patterns in race and housing characteristics in our weighted comparison boundaries in the pre-period are virtually identical to the treated boundaries. Our second strategy limits our sample to a subset of the HOLC borders that are least likely to have been predicted to be drawn based on our propensity score analysis. We hypothesize that the demarcation of many of these borders reflected idiosyncratic factors. For example, they may have been drawn simply to close a polygon and therefore may not reflect a gap in creditworthiness. Reassuringly, this sample of low propensity score borders exhibits *no* pre-existing differences or trends across the two sides of the boundaries and therefore eliminates the need for a comparison group.

We find that the maps affected the degree of racial segregation as measured by the fraction of African American residents on each side of a neighborhood boundary. Areas graded “D” (most risky) became more heavily African American than nearby C-rated areas over the 20th century. This gap rises steadily from 1930 until about 1970 or 1980 before declining thereafter. Moreover, we find a markedly similar pattern in “C” neighborhoods that bordered “B” neighborhoods. The C-B result is particularly noteworthy given there were virtually no black residents in either C or B neighborhoods prior to the maps. We believe these results reveal for the first time the importance of “yellow-lining” as a historical phenomenon.

The maps also had a meaningful negative effect on homeownership, house values, rents, and vacancy rates with comparable time patterns to the effects on racial segregation. This suggests that there was significant housing disinvestment in the wake of restricted credit access.² These effects were larger and a bit more persistent along the

² We discuss how reduced credit access and higher borrowing costs may lead to disinvestment in section VI. Appel and Nickerson (2016), which was written contemporaneously, also find that the HOLC maps affected home prices. Their analysis differs from ours in several important respects: 1) they use a regression discontinuity strategy that relies on the assumption of no pre-existing discontinuities along HOLC borders which we show does not hold in the data; 2) they combine all HOLC border types in their analysis, our results show that there are important differences across border types; 3) they do not analyze patterns of segregation, home ownership, rents, vacancies, or credit scores; 4) they only examine home prices in one year, 1990, which misses interesting dynamics over the 20th century; 5) their data only go back to 1940

C-B boundaries than the D-C boundaries. We consider some plausible explanations for the additional impact along C-B boundaries but are unable to come to any firm conclusions. We also show that our boundary results are robust to a number of reasonable modifications to measurement, sampling, and estimation approaches.

Lastly, we use a discontinuity strategy that exploits the HOLC's decision to limit maps to cities with a population of 40,000 or more. We compare the outcomes of cities with a population between 30,000 and 39,999 to cities with a population between 40,000 and 49,999 in 1930. Like our border design, we find that the cities with HOLC maps experienced a relative decline in home ownership, house values, and rents, which was accompanied by a rise in the share of African Americans. No analogous race or housing differential arises in a placebo experiment based on cities on either side of a 25,000 population cutoff. That our border results can be broadly replicated at the aggregate city level, at least for small urban areas, suggests that our localized estimates may not necessarily be offset in the aggregate due to other countervailing forces.

Indeed, looking across entire neighborhoods (not just across narrow boundaries), our findings suggest that the maps could account for between 15 and 30 percent of the D-C gap in share African-American and homeownership and 40 percent of the gap in house values over the 1950 to 1980 period. The maps account for roughly half of the homeownership and house value gaps along the C-B borders over the same period.

After 1970, many of our border estimates wane, perhaps indicating that federal policies designed to expand access to lending markets to low and moderate income households — such as the 1968 Fair Housing Act (FHA), the 1974 Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), and the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) — may have played a role in reversing the influence of the HOLC maps. Using more aggregate measures of segregation, Glaeser and Vigdor (2012) document a similar hump-shaped

which they consider to be a pre-treatment period, even though maps were completed before then. This sample period does not allow them to consider pre-existing trends; and 6) they use a much smaller set of cities. Krimmel (2017) also looks at the impact of the maps on a small set of cities but faces some of the same issues as Appel and Nickerson. Other studies, such as Hillier's (2005) seminal study of Philadelphia and Fishback's (2014) on New York, focus on individual cities.

secular pattern and likewise speculate that housing policies may have contributed to the decline in segregation post-1970. However, other factors undoubtedly contributed to these trends and this reversal clearly remains an important topic for future research.³

Our study contributes to several important literatures. The HOLC maps highlight how credit access influences the growth of urban neighborhoods (Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte, and Owens 2010; Autor, Palmer, and Pathak 2014; Diamond and McQuade 2017; Owens, Rossi-Hansberg, and Sarte 2018). Similar to other recent papers (Hornbeck 2012; Hornbeck and Keniston 2016; Feigenbaum, Lee, and Mezzanotti 2017; Shertzer, Twinam, and Walsh 2016), we document how an intervention can have a large and strikingly persistent impact on long-run community development. Our findings may also help shed light on the role of the HOLC maps in the rise of segregation in the decades immediately following WWII (Cutler and Glaeser 1997; Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor 1999; Ananat 2007; Boustan 2011; Glaeser and Vigdor 2012)⁴ and the link between housing and the black-white wealth gap (Blau and Graham 1990; Conley 2001; Charles and Hurst 2002; Krivo and Kaufman 2004).

I. Background

The HOLC and the City Survey Program

After the Great Depression, house prices fell precipitously and a foreclosure crisis ensued (White 2014).⁵ To address this devastating situation, the Roosevelt Administration initiated a series of federal programs intended to alter the nature of housing finance. These policies shifted mortgages from short duration loans with balloon

³ Other factors contributing to trends in segregation and urban disinvestment include restrictive covenants, zoning regulations (Shertzer, Twinam, and Walsh 2016), the location of highway construction (Brinkman and Lin 2017), urban renewal policies (Collins and Shester 2013), the urban riots of the 1960s (Collins and Margo 2007), public housing location (Hunt 2009), and FHA policies (Rothstein 2017). Some of these forces conceivably interacted with and were a part of the long-run reduced form effect of the HOLC maps.

⁴ Segregation rose sharply from 1910 to 1930 (Glaeser and Vigdor 2012; Shertzer and Walsh 2018). We focus on post-1940 period when segregation continued to rise, albeit at a slower pace.

⁵ For example, foreclosure rates in New York City rose from essentially zero in the 1920s to as high as 7 percent in 1935 and averaged about 2 to 3 percent per year during the early and mid-1930s (Ghent 2011).

payments to fully amortized higher loan-to-value mortgages with 15 to 20-year durations. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) introduced mortgage insurance and a secondary loan market was created by the Federal National Mortgage Agency (FNMA).⁶

In 1932, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) was created to charter and oversee federal savings and loan associations. The FHLBB essentially policed the operations of the newly created federal consumer banking system. One important new agency, operating at the direction of the FHLBB, was the Home Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC). Created in 1933, the HOLC was initially tasked with issuing bonds to buy and refinance mortgages at more favorable terms to borrowers. By 1936, the HOLC had refinanced roughly 10 percent of non-farm mortgages (Fishback et al 2011).

Our study focuses on an initiative undertaken by the HOLC at the behest of the FHLBB: to introduce a systematic appraisal process that included neighborhood-level characteristics when evaluating residential properties. The FHLBB was concerned about the long-term value of real estate now owned by the Federal Government, as well as the health of the lending industry which was devastated by the foreclosure crisis (Hillier 2005; Nicholas and Scherbina 2013). Using the new appraisal system, the HOLC drew residential “security” maps for 239 cities between 1935 and 1940 and completed more than 5 million appraisals. The maps and the appraisal process were seen as a mechanism for solving a coordination problem that would help ensure the continued stability of property values throughout the nation.⁷

The maps were based on the input of thousands of local brokers and appraisers, as well as neighborhood surveys of housing markets and demographic and economic

⁶ Several studies describe the residential real estate environment at the time and evaluate the effectiveness of HOLC and FHA initiatives to deal with the foreclosure crisis (Wheelock 2008, White 2014, Fishback et al 2011, Rose 2011, Ghent 2011, and Fishback et al 2017). Fishback et al (2017) emphasize complications in the mortgage market that slowed the 1930s housing recovery.

⁷ From Hillier (p. 210), citing an FHLBB document: “[HOLC] experts believe that since its interest is duplicated by that of all home-financing and mortgage institutions, a program can be evolved which will reclaim large residential areas which are doomed unless some concerted action is taken. Those experts believe that a joint program of Government agencies and private capital can save millions of dollars in property values now being wasted each year. If such efforts are undertaken in the future, the HOLC will be able to contribute surveys made of more than 300 cities throughout the United States—an accumulation of real estate and mortgage data never before available.”

characteristics. Neighborhoods were graded on a scale of A (least risky/most stable) to D (most risky/least stable). The appraisal manuals were candid in how they differentiated grades. Hillier (2005) quotes the 1937 FHLBB Appraisal Manual in describing neighborhood grades as follows:

- Grade A = “homogeneous,” in demand during “good times or bad.”
- Grade B = “like a 1935 automobile-still good, but not what the people are buying today who can afford a new one”
- Grade C = becoming obsolete, “expiring restrictions or lack of them” and “infiltration of a lower grade population.”
- Grade D = “those neighborhoods in which the things that are now taking place in the C neighborhoods, have already happened.”

The term “redlining” is thought by many to derive from the red shading that demarcated the lowest ranked D neighborhoods. There is clear evidence that the racial makeup of neighborhoods were explicit factors that were often pivotal in assigning grades to neighborhoods. This is apparent in the area description files (ADF) that accompanied the HOLC maps.⁸ A more formal statistical analysis in the Appendix confirms the importance of race and other economic and housing characteristics in determining HOLC grades.

How Were the HOLC Maps Used?

There is an active debate among historians about the degree to which lenders accessed the HOLC maps. Hillier (2003) stresses that access was not widespread despite

⁸ Appendix Figure A1 shows an example of an ADF for a D-graded area in Tacoma, Washington where it is stated that: “This might be classed as a ‘low yellow’ area if not for the presence of the number of Negroes and low class Foreign families who reside in the area.” In numerous other examples, race appears to be pivotal. Berkeley, California Area 2 (C-grade): “Northeastern part of area, north of University, could be classed as High Yellow, but for infiltration of Orientals and gradual infiltration of Negroes from south to north.”; Brooklyn, Bedford-Stuyvesant, Area 8 (D-grade): “Colored infiltration a definitely adverse influence on neighborhood desirability although Negroes will buy properties at fair prices and usually rent rooms.”; Oakland, Piedmont, Area 14 (B-grade): “Some parts of this area would be considered only High Yellow but for the rigid restrictions existing in Piedmont as to type of new construction and also the fact that there are no Negroes or Asiatics allowed in the city limits.”; Warren, Ohio Area 8 (C-grade): “Section is “killed” by influx of negroes from D-3 to attend Francis Willard School in C-8”; and Youngstown, Ohio Area 3 (D-grade): “Ever growing influx of Negroes and low class Jewish in the westerly end.”

high demand for the maps among private lenders. She argues that the FHLBB preserved their confidentiality as a matter of policy and allowed only a limited number of copies (50 to 60) of each map to be made. She further asserts that there is little historical record of the use of the maps prior to researchers discovering them in the U.S. National Archives.

These conclusions are disputed by Woods (2012), who argues that the FHLBB widely distributed HOLC appraisal practices and fostered close communication between the private sector and government institutions, and these interactions had a profound influence on creating a uniform appraisal process.⁹ Woods further claims that, as a matter of regulatory policy, banks were required to construct their own maps describing their geographic lending patterns.¹⁰ Therefore, it is plausible that the information in the maps filtered out and was used in lending decisions even if the actual maps were not disseminated. Given their large investment in the HOLC maps, it would seem to have been in the FHLBB's interest to share the maps' content despite its stated policy.¹¹

Moreover, there are suggestive anecdotes that some lenders accessed the maps. Jackson (1980), citing evidence from an FHLBB survey of New Jersey bankers and the participation of local realtors as consultants in constructing the St. Louis maps, argues

⁹ Examples included a) the creation of a Joint Committee on Appraisal and Mortgage Analysis in 1937 that included three private agencies whose purpose was "to share appraisal data throughout all segments of the national lending industry," and b) the dissemination of a monthly FHLBB journal entitled the *Federal Home Loan Bank Review* (circulation of 6,000) with articles "that provided painstaking detail regarding the influence of neighborhood demographics on mortgage finance." The list of subscribers "was so extensive that it reached a representative cross section of the national urban housing industry."

¹⁰ The FHLBB required that lending practices take into account neighborhood demographics. Woods specifically argues that "there existed a relationship between the HOLC security maps and FHLBB lending policies" (p. 1043). In particular, as a matter of policy, the balance sheets of lending institutions had to include a "security map of the institution's lending area" and that institutions were instructed that "the best method of grading residential neighborhoods as lending areas is to make a scientific analysis of the entire community and of each neighborhood within it." Woods further notes that "The FHLBB widely distributed the instructions necessary for creating this critical appraisal material throughout the national lending industry. The Mortgage Rehabilitation Division of the FHLBB 'has prepared simple instructions for making the security maps of residential neighborhoods' available 'to any experienced mortgage lender.' The Rehabilitation Division of the FHLBB 'recognize[d] four broad categories of lending areas, ranging from most desirable to least desirable. Each category was represented by a different color, so that the map could be read at a glance.' These four categories were identical to those created by the HOLC."

¹¹ Woods (2012) cites a 1935 Federal Home Loan Bank Review article: "[i]t is inevitable, therefore, that the HOLC's appraisals should exert a major influence in setting values on urban-home properties throughout the country. The magnitude of the operation insures that this influence shall be more than temporary, and that the Corporation's appraisals will affect all property values for many years."

that “private banking institutions were privy to and influenced by the government security maps” (p. 430). Hillier (2003) cites an example of a Chicago real estate official who wrote the following to the City Survey Program Director: “I hope to be able to ‘borrow’ a map from your portfolio when you are not looking during your journey in Chicago.” More broadly, Greer (2012) claims thousands of real estate professionals played a role in the creation of the maps and many remained involved in the industry through the post-War era. To take one publicly available example, eight of the 14 reviewers of the Cuyahoga County (Cleveland) HOLC map were from local lending institutions or appraisers.¹²

We will likely never know the degree to which lenders used the maps. It is clear, however, that the FHLBB fostered the practice of using maps to classify the credit worthiness of neighborhoods. If, in fact, the maps developed by lenders differed from the original HOLC maps such that boundaries were drawn along slightly different streets, it suggests that our estimates are, if anything, likely to *understate the overall effects of the general practice of redlining* even if they capture the effects of the HOLC maps.

FHA Manuals and Maps

The FHA created a parallel set of maps that likewise rated neighborhoods on a color-coded A to D scale and were based on a systematic appraisal process that took demographic characteristics of neighborhoods into account. Indeed, the 1930s and 1940s FHA manuals explicitly emphasize “undesirable racial or nationality groups” as one of the underwriting standards; their use was ultimately outlawed by the 1968 Federal Housing Act and the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act.¹³ The enormous influence of

¹² See https://library.osu.edu/projects/redlining-maps-ohio/area-descriptions/CuyahogaCounty_Explanation_and_A1-A31_Area_Description.pdf.

¹³ See Jackson (1980) and Light (2010) for discussions of how FHA risk maps and underwriter instructions were created. The 1934 FHA manual includes race as one of the underwriting standards to be applied to new loans: “The more important among the adverse influential factors (of a neighborhood’s character) are the ingress of undesirable racial or nationality groups...All mortgages on properties in neighborhoods definitely protected in any way against the occurrence of unfavorable influences obtain a higher rating. The possibility of occurrence of such influences within the life of the mortgage would cause a lower rating or disqualification.” See <http://archives.ubalt.edu/aclu/pdf/Plex48.pdf>. Frederick Babcock, a Chicago realtor who later became the Director of the underwriting division of the FHA wrote in a 1932 book, *The Valuation of Real Estate*: “most of the variations and differences between people are slight and value declines are, as

the FHA is highlighted by the fact that, by 1949, one-third of newly constructed homes were insured by the FHA (Woods 2012). Therefore, perhaps at least as important as whether lenders had direct access to the HOLC maps is whether the HOLC maps were shared with the FHA and thus influenced the provision of housing credit through the FHA's decisions regarding whether to insure loans in low graded neighborhoods.

On this issue, there is more agreement among historians. Light (2010) highlights "ample evidence" to support the influence of the HOLC appraisal methods and maps on the FHA's practices.¹⁴ As an example, Woods (2012) cites a 1938 FHA underwriting manual that provided examples taken directly from HOLC appraisals. Hillier (2003) also states that the HOLC maps were shared with the FHA as well as other government agencies. However, she minimizes the link between the FHA and HOLC by noting that the FHA had their own independent sources of information for developing maps.

The limited availability of FHA maps today makes a broad comparison with the HOLC maps infeasible (Light 2011). However, in one prominent and available case, there is a strong resemblance. Roughly 82 percent of population-weighted Chicago has the same grade on both maps, including 86 percent of D graded areas. However, we acknowledge that we cannot speak to the similarity of other cities, so we instead emphasize that our estimates capture the sum of any HOLC and FHA effects where the boundaries align and only the HOLC effect where the boundaries differ.

a result, gradual. But there is one difference in people, namely race, which can result in a very rapid decline. Usually such declines can be partially avoided by segregation and this device has always been in common usage in the South where white and Negro populations have been separated" (Rutan 2016, p. 36). Thurston (2018) describes how the NAACP received a number of complaints about discriminatory mortgage lending practices as early as the late 1930s and consequently confronted senior FHA leadership. For example, drawing from a 1938 letter from Roy Wilkins, Assistant Secretary of the NAACP to Stewart McDonald, Director of the FHA, Thurston states: "NAACP officials also continued with their investigation into lending practices in the Jamaica area, learning from banks and developers that lenders in the New York City area seemed to be aware of an FHA policy and rejected loans in anticipation of it, as well as an FHA practice of requiring restrictive covenants on the properties it insured" (Thurston 2018, p. 109).

¹⁴ See footnote 85 of Light (2010): "FHA records indicate the agency kept the HOLC security maps on file in connection with the construction of its Economic Data System ... and comments from Federal Home Loan Bank Board general counsel Horace Russell on how the FHA 'was fortunate in being able to avail itself of much of the (t)raining and experience in appraisal and the development of appraisal data by Home Owners Loan Corporation' underscores the two agencies' close ties."

Mortgage Lending in pre-WWII Baltimore

Ultimately, much of this historical narrative could be resolved by quantifying the maps' direct impact on access to mortgage credit. Unfortunately, that is not broadly possible due to a lack of national pre-WWII loan data. However, we can provide some insight from the flow of all new mortgage contracts in Baltimore, Maryland between 1926 and 1950 using a 1 percent random sample of city blocks digitized by Jonathan Rose of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Those data can in turn be stratified into graded neighborhoods based on Baltimore's 1937 HOLC map.

Figure 1a plots growth in mortgage originations, normalized to average annual loan flow between 1926 and 1928, by neighborhood HOLC grade. There is no meaningful difference in the *trend* in mortgage originations between B, C, and D neighborhoods prior to 1937.¹⁵ But after the Baltimore map is drawn in 1937, lending increases notably in B but remains relatively flat in C and D neighborhoods. With the unsurprising exception of WWII, this pattern continues through at least 1950.

The relative growth in B neighborhood loans is consistent with the Federal Government's intention to encourage lending in such areas. But it is somewhat surprising that there is no clear difference between C and D areas. This may be because all mortgages, not just those insured by the FHA, are included in Figure 1a. If instead, we concentrate on FHA-backed mortgages, Figure 1b shows that new lending in D neighborhoods, which already represented a small fraction of activity prior to the maps, collapses during the late 1930s.¹⁶ By contrast, FHA-insured loans increase in two of the three other graded neighborhoods (as well as those that are ungraded) in the years immediately following the map relative to the years immediately prior.

¹⁵ There are too few A-graded neighborhoods to study in light of the 1 percent sampling.

¹⁶ There were zero D-graded loans in 1940, compared to 18 in 1937. The FHA data includes all Baltimore census blocks, not just Rose's 1 percent block sample. Related, Rose collected the stock of mortgages from his 1 percent block sample for the years 1930 and 1940. Over that decade, the total number of mortgages shrunk by 31 percent in D graded blocks, 22 percent in B and C blocks, and 13 percent in A blocks.

We take the Baltimore example as highly suggestive and novel evidence that the FHA adopted essentially a ban on insuring loans to D areas while private lenders may have become more wary of both C and D neighborhoods relative to higher graded areas.

II. Data and Descriptive Facts

HOLC Maps and Area Description Files

We obtained geocoded renderings of the original HOLC maps for 149 cities from the Digital Scholarship Lab at the University of Richmond.¹⁷ Figure 2 shows that the geographic coverage is extensive. The 149 cities comprise 89 percent of residents of the 100 largest cities in 1930 and 1940, including 9 of the largest 10 and 17 of the largest 20 cities, and 30 of the 42 cities with a population above 200,000.¹⁸ The maps for three prominent cities – Chicago, New York, and San Francisco – are displayed in Figure 3. The large set of boundaries separating neighborhood types, especially evident in New York and San Francisco, illustrate our main identification strategy that takes advantage of households living in a narrow band on each side of an HOLC border.

To identify HOLC boundaries, we begin with outlines of cities from the Census 2000 place boundary shapefile. An ID is assigned to each line segment of an HOLC boundary that is at least a quarter mile long. We then draw rectangles that extend a quarter of a mile on each side of a boundary. These areas are referred to interchangeably as boundary buffer zones, buffer zones, or buffers. Each boundary has two buffers: the lower graded side (LGS) and higher graded side (HGS). We also refer to boundaries between C and D neighborhoods as “D-C” and those separating B and C areas as “C-B.”¹⁹

¹⁷ See Appendix Table A1 for the list of cities.

¹⁸ Of the 20 most populous cities, we are missing Los Angeles (#5), Washington DC (#11), and Cincinnati (#17). Our 149 cities contain over a quarter of the total U.S. population.

¹⁹ There are too few “A” areas to study B-A boundaries. In the spirit of analyzing similar neighbors, we exclude boundaries separated by more than one grade (e.g. D-B). See Appendix Figure A2 for a depiction of NYC boundary buffers as an example.

Accompanying the maps are a set of area description files (ADFs) that provide additional quantitative and qualitative detail on the neighborhoods. An example of an ADF for a Tacoma, Washington neighborhood is provided in Appendix Figure A1.

1910 to 2010 Censuses

We match the geocoded maps to the 1910 to 2010 Censuses. For 1910 to 1940, we use the 100 percent count files and are able to match between 60 and 80 percent of household heads with non-missing street addresses to modern street locations. Ultimately, roughly 50 to 80 percent of respondents are assigned HOLC neighborhoods.²⁰ We aggregate our measures to the boundary buffer level by taking means of all observations which fall inside of a buffer zone so long as it contains at least 3 households.

After 1940, we must use publicly available aggregate data. The smallest geography currently available for 1950 to 1980 is the census tract. Since tracts change over time, we overlay tract boundaries from each census with our boundary buffer shapes and calculate weighted means of any tract for which at least 15 percent of the area of the tract lies within the boundary buffer.²¹ Starting in 1990, the census provides smaller geographic tabulations called blocks, which contain on average roughly 100 people.²² Since blocks are much smaller than tracts, we use weighted means of blocks for which its area is more than 50 percent within the boundary buffer. Combined, this procedure produces a balanced panel of boundary buffer means from 1910 to 2010. In section IV,

²⁰ See Appendix Table A2. As might be expected, characteristics such as race and home ownership predict the probability of being geocoded. However, our empirical strategy (described below) of comparing changes over time in boundary differences to changes over time in control boundary differences (a triple difference) should be robust to any sample selection concerns around geocoding. Regardless, our results are robust to focusing on cities with high geocoding rates (see Section IV). Some additional detail about data consistency with regard to housing measures is provided in the Appendix.

²¹ The choice of the 15 percent threshold balances a tradeoff between sample size and measurement precision. Our results are robust to alternative census tract inclusion thresholds such as 10, 20 or 25 percent.

²² Some variables, notably house value, rent, house age, and foreign born population, are only reported at the block group level, which are aggregates of blocks and typically contain between 600 and 3,000 people. For these variables, we assign the block the values of the block group it is in. In 2000 (2010), there were over 8 (11) million blocks, 208,790 (217,740) block groups, and 65,443 (73,057) census tracts.

we explicitly show that our results are not driven by changing the underlying geography from address to tract to blocks over time or from selection into the sample.

Credit Bureau Data

We supplement the Census with credit bureau data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's Consumer Credit Panel (CCP). The CCP covers roughly 5 percent of the population and provides block-level credit data between 1999 and 2016. We use two measures: a) mean of the Equifax Risk Score™ and b) the share of borrowers that are subprime, traditionally measured by Equifax as a score below 620.

Summary Statistics

Table 1 shows summary statistics by neighborhood grade. Panel A reports the share of African Americans over time. Columns (1) to (4) include households in the 543 neighborhoods with an A grade, 1,351 with a B grade, 2,156 with a C grade, and 1,399 with a D grade. In 1930, before the maps were drawn, African Americans comprised 14.6 percent of residents living in D neighborhoods but only 1.5 percent of those living in C neighborhoods, a gap of 13.1 percentage points (pps). By 1980, African Americans grew to 46.2 and 30.7 percent of residents in D and C neighborhoods. These rates converged to 35.7 and 29.0 percent, respectively, by 2010. The time patterns in share African American for each neighborhood grade are shown graphically in Panel A of Figure 4.

Statistics for those living in a buffer zone on each side of the 1,965 C-B and 2,111 D-C boundaries that meet our criteria are shown in columns (5) to (8). The C-B and D-C boundary differences or gaps are reported in columns (9) and (10). As expected, the gap in the share of African Americans is always smaller along the D-C boundary buffer zones than between the full D and C neighborhoods. For example, in 1930, the gap along the D-C boundary buffers was 7.2 pps (column 10), compared to 13.1 pps across all D-C residents (columns 4 minus 3). The racial gaps within the D-C boundary peaked at between 15 and 17 pps between 1950 and 1970, before declining sharply thereafter. By 2010, the gap stood at just 3.1 pps. This secular hump-shaped pattern in the racial gap

also characterizes the C-B boundaries. There was a relatively meager 0.4 percentage point gap in 1930 that grows to 5.7 pps by 1970 and then subsequently declines.

Panel B of Table 1 and Figure 4 show corresponding patterns for home ownership. In 1930, the D-C and C-B home ownership boundary gaps were 5.2 and 4.9 pps, respectively. These gaps increased to 6.2 and 7.1 pps by 1960. Thereafter, the patterns diverge by border type. As of 2010, the homeownership gap declined to just 2.3 pps along the D-C boundaries but remained elevated at 6.4 pps for C-B borders. Panels C and D of Figure 4 plot the patterns for house values and rents. Like homeownership, we find that gaps in house values and rents continue to exist even today and are larger among the C-B borders than the D-C borders.²³

III. Identification and Methodology

Our strategy is guided by the historical narrative that the creators of the HOLC maps explicitly considered neighborhood characteristics and their trends when drawing borders. This narrative is confirmed by the HOLC's area description files that accompanied the maps and provided explanations for the grades. Therefore, we use multiple approaches to try to overcome this obstacle to identification.

Differencing

We begin by considering a naive difference-in-differences (DD) strategy. DD compares changes over time in neighborhood-level outcomes, pre- and post-construction of the HOLC maps in places that are spatially proximate but on different sides of an HOLC boundary, similar in spirit to a border regression discontinuity design (RD) used extensively elsewhere (e.g. Holmes 1998; Black 1999; Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan 2007; Dube, Lester, and Reich 2010; and many others). Along the line segments that

²³ House values and rents become available in 1930 and are expressed in 2010 dollars. Table 1 also shows secular patterns in share immigrant and credit scores. The Appendix reports statistical models of the determinants of HOLC grades. Like Hillier (2005) and Fishback (2014), who examine single cities, we find a clear monotonic relationship between grades and nearly all the key census economic and housing measures, including those not reported in Table 1, whether considered individually or simultaneously.

make up these boundaries, we compare nearby neighbors that live within buffer zones 1/4 mile (1,320 feet) from the boundary. This allows us to remove potentially important, but typically hard to measure, confounding factors that influence residents on both sides of a border, such as access to labor markets, public transportation, retail stores, and the like.

The statistical model underlying the DD estimator is:

$$(1) \quad y_{gbt} = \sum_{t=1910}^{2010} \beta_t 1[lgs] \gamma_t + \beta_{lgs} 1[lgs] + \gamma_t + \alpha_b + \epsilon_{gbt}$$

where y_{gbt} is an outcome in geographic unit g (e.g. 1/4 mile boundary buffer) on boundary b , in census year t , $1[lgs]$ is an indicator that the geographic unit is on the lower-graded side of the HOLC boundary, γ_t are year dummies, and α_b are boundary fixed effects. Differencing across the boundary is captured by the α_b 's. Our coefficients of interest, the β_t 's, capture the change in the mean outcome in year t relative to 1930 (the census year before the maps were drawn, which we omit). The gap in the mean outcome in year t is therefore $\beta_t + \beta_{lgs}$ for years other than 1930 and β_{lgs} for 1930.

Parallel Trends Assumption Likely Violated

The DD strategy relies on the strong assumption that in the absence of the policy change, trends in characteristics would be parallel for both the treatment and comparison group. The plausibility of this assumption is typically gauged by examining trends in the pre-treatment period. In our case, we have good reason to expect that pre-trends are not parallel. We know from the area description files that the choice of the placement of borders was based in part on demographic and housing characteristics which were already diverging along these boundaries. Indeed, this divergence can be seen clearly in columns (9) and (10) of Table 1. Ideally, the 1910 to 1930 D-C and C-B outcome gaps are negligible and constant. However, as early as 1910, there was a 3 percentage point African American gap between the D and C sides, which grew to 7 pps by 1930. Similarly, there is no evidence that gaps were stable prior to 1940 in homeownership (panel B), house values (panel C), or rents (panel D). While, the racial gap along C-B

boundaries is virtually non-existent before the maps were drawn, that is not the case for home ownership, house values, and rents.

Moreover, a RD design will likely not satisfy the assumption of continuity along the borders. We show examples of several distance plots in Appendix Figure A3 where each dot represents the mean characteristic (regression adjusted for border fixed effects) in bins of $1/100^{\text{th}}$ of a mile (roughly 50 feet) of distance in each direction from the D-C or C-B border. It is clear that for several of our outcomes, even limiting our sample to observations that are just a city block away from the border would lead to meaningful discontinuities and render an RD design invalid.

We propose two strategies to address the failure of parallel trends to be a plausible assumption along the HOLC borders.

Comparison Boundaries

The first strategy creates a set of comparison boundaries with similar characteristics and trends to the HOLC treatment boundaries before the maps were drawn. We motivate this approach by what we refer to as “missing” HOLC borders. It may have been difficult to construct polygons that reflected completely homogeneous neighborhoods if there were small areas within neighborhoods that were fundamentally different. A stylized illustration is depicted in the top panel of Appendix Figure A4 where there is a small island of C type streets within a larger ocean of D. The Chicago HOLC map (Figure 3) also shows that this is plausible. Among the large swath of D (red) in the heart of Chicago, there are surely pockets that might be appropriately labeled C or higher.

We identify these potential comparison boundaries by first drawing $\frac{1}{2}$ mile by $\frac{1}{2}$ mile grids over each city. We then create $\frac{1}{4}$ mile boundary buffers around any grid line segment that does not overlap with HOLC treatment boundaries. This set of boundaries are referred to as our “grid” comparisons.²⁴ Propensity scoring methods are applied to

²⁴ See Appendix Figure A5 for an example of a grid placed over NYC. We also considered an alternative comparison boundary that uses “same-grade” (e.g. B-B, C-C or D-D) borders as a comparison group. The

construct weights for the grid comparison group. A byproduct of weighting the comparison group is that the pre-treatment differences in outcomes and covariates become very small.²⁵ We use the logic that if pre-treatment differences are eliminated using these weights, then it may be valid to interpret any post-treatment difference between treatment and comparison boundaries as an estimate of the causal effect of the HOLC grade. Since each set of treated boundaries has a side which has been deemed riskier by the HOLC (such as the D side of a D-C boundary), an analogous construct is needed for the comparison boundaries. Consequently, we randomly assign one side of each comparison boundary to be the riskier or lower graded side.²⁶ In parallel to the treatment boundaries, we then construct the difference or gap between the mean of our outcome on the “higher-graded” and “lower-graded” side.

To construct the propensity score, we pool the treatment and grid comparison boundaries, where each boundary is an observation. For each grade type difference (D-C or C-B), only comparison boundaries from the same HOLC graded areas are used. That is, when we estimate the effects of the D-C borders, we only include C-C or D-D boundaries and not A-A or B-B boundaries. We then estimate the following probit separately for D-C and C-B boundaries:

$$(2) \quad 1\{Treated\}_{b,c} = \alpha_c + \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_{1910}^k z_{b,c}^{k,1910} + \beta_{1920}^k z_{b,c}^{k,1920} + \beta_{1930}^k z_{b,c}^{k,1930} + \epsilon_{b,c}$$

HOLC often drew boundaries separating two “unique” neighborhoods with the same grade. We are not sure why this was done but we speculate that cities were first broken into neighborhoods and then each neighborhood was evaluated. Using same-grade boundaries as a comparison group yields similar, albeit less precise, estimates (Appendix Figures A7 and A8) than what we find using our grid-based comparison group where we can create much larger samples. We prefer using grids because the same-grade boundaries may induce some treatment effect due to having a boundary associated with it.

²⁵ We also tried the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) of Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) and found similar results. We prefer the propensity score method for our application as SCM is more difficult to implement without a balanced panel of geographic units (in our case, address-tract-block).

²⁶ Random assignment ensures that the distribution of the within boundary differences in our comparison group is representative of all comparison boundaries and is not skewed toward either tail of the distribution.

where $1\{Treated\}_{b,c}$ is an indicator variable for whether boundary b in city c is a “treated” boundary, α_c is a city fixed effect, and $z_{b,c}^{k,t} = x_{lgs,b,c}^{k,t} - x_{hgs,b,c}^{k,t}$ are the gap between an explanatory variable k on the lower-graded side (lgs) and the higher graded-side (hgs) at time $t = 1910, 1920, \text{ and } 1930$. The variables indexed by k include share African American, African American population density, white population density, share foreign born, the home ownership rate, the share of homeowner households that have a mortgage, log house value, and log rent.²⁷

Our estimate of the propensity score (pscore) is equal to the predicted probability of treatment from equation (2). Weights are then formed for the comparison boundaries as $w = \frac{pscore}{1-pscore}$ and for the “treated” boundaries as $w = 1$. This procedure produces considerable overlap in the distributions of the propensity scores for the treated and comparison groups (Appendix Figure A6, Panels A and B).²⁸ Consequently, the reweighted comparison boundaries look more comparable to the treated boundaries than the unweighted comparison boundaries. Panels C and D of Appendix Figure A6 demonstrates this critical implication for the homeownership rate.

Exploiting Idiosyncratic Borders

A second simpler strategy to eliminating confounding factors takes advantage of the possibility that some HOLC boundaries might have been more idiosyncratic in nature and were drawn simply to close a polygon. Consider the hypothetical example of a “misaligned” border where the northern part of the neighborhood contains largely red

²⁷ The model is run using a balanced panel in which at least one of the following three variables contains no missing values (on either boundary side) from 1910 through 1930: share African American, the homeownership rate, or share foreign born. House values and rents are only available in 1930. Whether the household has a mortgage is only available in 1910 and 1920. For a measure that should be available but is missing, it is recoded to a constant value and a missing indicator variable is turned on. The probit models are weighted by the log total population of the buffers on both sides of the boundary. We experimented with adding data from transcribed area description files. However, they added little explanatory power and led to a significant reduction in sample size due to spotty coverage. We also experimented with nearest neighbor matching but found our samples were too thin once we limit neighbors to the same city.

²⁸ The sample is trimmed to exclude treated borders with a propensity score above the maximum comparison border and comparison borders with a propensity score below the minimum treated border.

blocks and the southern area contains largely yellow blocks. It may not have been entirely clear where exactly to draw the southern border and the HOLC agents may have just chosen a major street several blocks from the actual red-yellow demarcation to define the neighborhood. Such “treated” boundaries may not reflect a discontinuous change in creditworthiness and would be much less likely to exhibit pre-trends in outcomes.²⁹

We identify these idiosyncratic boundaries by selecting borders whose propensity score – or predicted probability of being treated -- is below the median. This approach is akin to the method of subclassification, also known as blocking or stratification, discussed in Imbens (2015) and Imbens and Rubin (2015). Their idea is to partition the sample into subclasses based on the value of the estimated propensity score so that, within a subclass, differences in the covariate distribution are small. Causal effects can be inferred within a subclass as if assignment was random. Our particular application motivates focusing on the low propensity score subclass, as these boundaries are most likely to be idiosyncratic since they have covariate distributions similar to our comparison group of randomly drawn grid boundaries. As we show later, the low propensity score subsample of treated borders exhibits virtually no pre-trends. While this strategy is more straightforward and does not rely on the comparison group except when estimating the propensity scores, it reduces power and may not generalize to all borders if there are heterogeneous effects.

IV. Main Results

We start by describing our baseline results – a contrast of HOLC boundaries to weighted comparison boundaries -- separately for D-C and C-B. We then turn to a second

²⁹ A visual of this example is provided in the bottom panel of Appendix Figure A4. A common example of such a situation is found in the area description file for a neighborhood (D98) in Chicago where the notes mention that “The eastern portion of the area is not quite so heavily populated with foreign element.” Therefore, the particular street used to demarcate the eastern boundary may have been idiosyncratic. We considered directly trying to capture the phenomenon of “closing the polygon” by looking only at neighborhoods that had “multiple” different grade treated boundaries and then using only the boundary that had the lowest propensity score. The logic is that the lowest propensity score border within a polygon is most likely drawn to close the shape. In practice, the sample of such boundaries is too small.

set of results based on low propensity score treated boundaries that we argue were most likely idiosyncratically chosen. Finally, we consider an array of robustness checks.

Baseline Results along the D-C Boundary

To show how we arrive at our baseline specification, Table 2 walks through a detailed accounting for one particular outcome, the share African American, along one type of boundary, D-C.³⁰ Column (1) begins by comparing entire neighborhoods (D vs. C) rather than just the narrow buffer zones around HOLC borders. Specifically, we estimate a version of Equation (1) where the geographic unit g indexes HOLC neighborhoods and boundary fixed effects α_b are excluded. Consistent with Table 1, the D-C gap in the share African American is large in 1930, at 13.5 (1.4) percentage points, rises to 25 (2.1) pps in 1960, and then falls to 8.1 (1.6) pps by 2010.³¹ Adding city fixed effects (column 2) has little impact.

The consequence of using buffer zones becomes apparent when we move to column (3), which limits the analysis to households living within $\frac{1}{4}$ mile of a boundary. Now the D-C gap starts at just 6.3 (1.0) pps in 1930, rises to 13.8 (2.7) pps by 1970 and thereafter falls to 3.7 (0.8) pps points by 2010. These estimates are modestly lower when we include boundary fixed effects (column 4). However, although the variation is now restricted to comparing residents living, at most, a quarter mile from the same boundary, there are still significant pre-trends in 1910 to 1930.

To further address the pre-existing differences along our boundary buffers, column (5) shows estimates obtained from using our weighted comparison borders based on the propensity score analysis. The comparison borders successfully mimic the pre-trends in the treated boundaries. For example, they show a D-C gap in African American share of 2.4 (0.6) pps in 1920 rising to 5.4 (1.2) pps in 1930. This 3.0 pp increase is essentially equivalent to the 3.3 pp increase in the treated boundaries.

³⁰ Analogous tables for the other outcomes along the D-C borders are in Appendix Tables A3 to A5.

³¹ City-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Bootstrapped standard errors, stratified by city, are similar in magnitude.

However, *after the maps were drawn*, the treated and comparison estimates diverge sharply. These patterns are illustrated in panel A of Figure 5, which plots the estimates and standard error bands for both the treated and comparison groups. We find that the gap in the share African American in the treated group continues to rise in subsequent decades and peaks as high as 11.3 (2.3) pps by 1970 before declining. In contrast, the analogous gap in the comparison group drops slightly to 4.0 (0.9) pps in 1940 before reverting to roughly 0 by 1960. By 2010, the estimates are 3.4 (0.7) pps in the treated group and 0.6 (0.5) pps in the comparison group.

A set of “triple difference” estimates that differences the treatment and comparison group estimates relative to 1930 are reported in column (6) of Table 2 (and plotted in Appendix Figure A7). A racial gap emerges in 1940 and continues to rise, peaking at 11.2 (3.1) pps in 1970 before beginning to converge. Nevertheless, there still remains an economically relevant 2 to 3 percentage point racial gap during 1990 to 2010, more than a half century after the maps were drawn.

A parallel analysis for our three housing related outcomes -- homeownership, house values, and rents -- is displayed in the remaining panels of Figure 5 (point estimates and standard errors are shown in Appendix Tables A3 through A5). In all three cases, we again document pre-existing gaps along the HOLC boundaries which we are able to successfully reproduce using propensity score weighting of comparison boundaries. We also find meaningful differences emerge between the treated and comparison boundaries starting in 1940, generally grow larger in subsequent decades, and persist to varying degrees through 2010.

Specifically, after the HOLC maps were drawn, the home ownership gap was relatively constant at around -3 to -4 pps through 1980 before falling to -1 to -2 pps by the 1990 to 2010 period. By contrast, the homeownership gap in the comparison boundaries closed relatively quickly and remained roughly 0 (with a standard error of around 1 pp) through 2010. The relative widening of the homeownership gap between the treatment and comparison boundaries, especially through 1980, was accompanied by parallel gaps in house values and rents. Among treated boundaries, the D-C house value

gap starts at around -16 (1.2) pps in 1930, gradually climbs to around -27 (4.0) pps by 1980, before falling to around -8 (1.3) pps by 2000 and -2.6 (1.3) pps in 2010. The house value gap in the comparison boundaries quickly reverts from a similar level to the treated boundaries in 1930 to statistically indistinguishable from zero by 1950 and after. The peak in the rent gap occurs earlier than the other outcomes and steadily declines after 1950. But as of 2010, it also remains statistically and economically meaningful.

Baseline Results along the C-B Boundary

Figure 6 presents results along the C-B boundaries. As noted earlier, the African American population was sparse in B and C neighborhoods in 1930 so as expected, pre-trends for racial gaps are not an issue (Panel A). After the maps were drawn, however, a meaningful gap of about 4 percentage points opens up by 1950 and continues to rise to a peak of over 8 percentage points by 1970 before gradually reverting to about 2 percentage points by 2010. In contrast, we estimate a virtually flat line around 0 for the comparison boundaries. These results suggest that restricted access to credit in yellow areas (“yellow-lining”) was also a meaningful phenomenon.³²

We find consistent evidence of C-B gaps opening up in housing market measures as well (Figure 6, Panels B to D). The C-B home ownership gap was roughly 5.5 pps by 1950 and peaked at around 7 to 8 pps from 1990 through 2010. By comparison, the D-C home ownership gap topped out around 4 pps and is about 2 pps as of 2010. Likewise, as of 2010, the C-B gap in house values stood at 7.5 percent, three times larger than our estimated D-C house value gap.³³ In Section VI, we consider explanations for a larger impact along the C-B borders.

Long-run Effects on Credit Scores

We used the same methods to examine the long run (post-1999) effect of the maps on modern-day credit scores, including the likelihood of being considered

³² Triple difference estimates are reported in Appendix Figure A8.

³³ Appel and Nickerson (2016) report a 4 percentage point gap in 1990 house values across all boundaries.

“subprime” (Equifax Risk Score<620). For the treated boundaries, we find statistically significant credit score gaps that are always worse on the lower-graded side (see Appendix Figure A9). As of 2016, the D-C gap stood at 8.0 (1.9) pps and the C-B gap was 9.4 (2.3) pps. Similarly, the probability of being subprime is currently just over 3 pps on the higher graded side of both boundaries. The subprime gap was larger in the 2000s, especially during the Great Recession.

Estimates from Low Propensity Score Borders

Our second strategy attempts to isolate borders that may have been more idiosyncratic in nature by honing in on the sample of low propensity score borders that our statistical models predict were least likely to have been drawn.³⁴ The low propensity point estimates for the share African American gap are shown in column (7) of Table 2 and plotted in the blue line of Figure 7’s Panel A. For ease of reference, the grey line reproduces estimates for all treated borders (column 4 of Table 2).

Perhaps what is most compelling about this strategy is that there is no longer a pre-trend for the low propensity D-C borders –the gap in 1910, 1920 and 1930 is essentially zero. If pre-trends are broadly nonexistent with this method, the low propensity method might be particularly useful in cases where we do not have pre-1940 data. Moreover, this research design also produces a smooth continuous function with no abrupt change near the border in 1930 (see Panel A of Appendix Figure A10). On the other hand, there is the possibility that the results from these borders may not generalize to the full population. If there are heterogeneous effects, we suspect that the low propensity score method could lead us to understate the average effect. This would occur if low propensity score borders had other positive features that protected the neighborhood housing stock and therefore understate the typical effect of receiving a low grade from the HOLC. We acknowledge, however, that this is just a conjecture and there may be valid reasons why effects could be larger along these borders.

³⁴ Low propensity score boundaries are somewhat more prevalent in the Northeast.

Using the low propensity score borders, we find that there is a meaningful rise in the D-C gap in share African American after the maps are drawn that peaks at a 9.1 (2.1) percentage point difference in 1970 before falling to just below 2 (0.8) percentage points by 2010. Notably, the timing and magnitude of these gaps is similar to the triple difference estimates that use the *full* sample of D-C borders.

The remaining panels of Figure 7 plot the D-C estimates for the three housing outcomes and for the corresponding race and housing outcomes along C-B boundaries. In every case the use of the low propensity boundaries largely eliminates gaps and trends in the pre-map period. Further, for most of the outcomes, the low propensity estimates after the maps were drawn are nearly identical to the estimates using all treated boundaries. An exception is home ownership along the C-B borders; here, the gap did not grow nearly as large in the post-map period using the low propensity borders. As of 2010, the C-B homeownership gap based on low propensity treated boundaries was roughly half as large (3.6 pps) as estimates using all treated boundaries (7.0 pps).

Overall, we are agnostic as to method. Regardless, the maps appear to have had economically significant negative effects on the lower graded side of the HOLC border.

Robustness Checks

We considered a number of additional robustness checks. First, we use a narrower $\frac{1}{8}$ mile-wide cutoff on each side of the boundary to construct our buffer zone. There is a tradeoff in using a narrower buffer between having a more similar across-boundary group on the one hand and having smaller samples and a greater share of the sample that is potentially contaminated by across-border spillovers. Second, we restrict our samples to cities with a high (above the median) rate of geocoding in 1920. Third, we exclude all borders with a significant overlap with rivers or railroads under the assumption that these borders may be most prone to pre-existing trends. Fourth, we use a consistent level of geography -- census tracts -- in all years. This is a potentially important check because we often find a sharp increase in outcome gaps between 1950 and 1980 which is precisely when we are using the most highly aggregated data.

In all of these exercises, which are organized by outcome and border type in Appendix Figures A11 to A14, we find that the results are broadly comparable to our benchmark estimates in Figures 5 and 6. Notably, even when we use a consistent level of geography, we continue to find that the 1950 to 1980 period remains well above the pre-period and convergence begins post-1980. As an added safeguard, however, we also constructed a “geography-consistent” time-series that adjusts the baseline 1950 to 1980 point estimates by an estimate of the bias from using tracts in these years.³⁵

V. Identification at the City Level: the 40,000 Population Cutoff

Next, we examine city-level outcomes rather than across-boundary differences by exploiting a particular program discontinuity. The FHLBB chose to draw maps only in places with a population of 40,000 or more. This cutoff enables a comparison of the outcomes of cities with a pre-map population just above 40,000 to cities just below. Our working assumption is that cities on either side of 40,000 would not be systematically different with respect to the outcomes we consider. Therefore, any relative difference that emerges over subsequent decades could be attributed to the HOLC maps. We have not encountered any anecdotal evidence that the population cutoff was a strategic choice but we assess this assumption below by analyzing placebo population cutoffs.

In principle, this research design is cleaner since we have a stronger case for exogenous treatment. But there are shortcomings, particularly with regard to statistical power and generalizability.³⁶ There may also be concern that the maps’ impact might be difficult to detect at the city level compared to precisely targeted neighborhoods around HOLC borders. Consequently, we broadly consider the city analysis a complement to our

³⁵ Specifically, we construct a block-to-tract adjustment ratio $\frac{\beta_{1990-2010,c}^{block}}{\beta_{1990-2010,c}^{tract}}$ based on block-level and census tract-level estimates derived from the 1990 to 2010 Censuses when both geographies are available and when the denominator is not very close to zero. This adjustment typically, but not always, lowers our 1950 to 1980 estimates but has little impact on the general contours of our results.

³⁶ Estimates derived from only the smallest HOLC cities might not be externally valid if there are heterogeneous effects by city size. In the Appendix, we show that there is no compelling evidence of differences by city size. However, that analysis excluded cities with very few borders, including virtually all cities with a population under 50,000 in 1930 that we use in this exercise.

preferred baseline boundary estimates. An economically significant impact at the city level could suggest that our localized estimates may not be offset in the aggregate due to other countervailing forces.

We compare 27 redlined treatment cities with a 1930 population between 40,000 and 50,000 to a comparison group of 26 non-redlined cities with a population of 30,000 to 40,000.³⁷ A list of the cities along with their 1930 population and their mean outcomes in 1930 and 1980 can be found in Appendix Table A6. Our control sample of cities (Panel A) appears to be, if anything, more negatively selected on housing characteristics and has a higher share of African Americans than the treated cities (Panel B). However, the differences are relatively small. For example, the 1930 mean home ownership rate is 46 percent in the comparison cities and 48 percent in the treated cities. By 1980, however, the comparison cities have a higher home ownership rate at 58 percent compared to 55 percent in the treated group of redlined cities. This shift in the relative gap in home ownership of 5 percentage points happens to be of a similar magnitude to the 4 and 4.5 percentage points in the 1980 D-C and C-B homeownership gap using our boundary triple difference estimates.

Figure 8 plots the results. From 1910 to 1940, housing outcomes were largely similar in both treated and untreated cities. But in subsequent decades, home ownership rates, house values, and rents grew faster in untreated cities, only reverting somewhat back to pre-1940 norms in recent decades. The racial gap also begins to diverge after 1940 but surprisingly has yet to show evidence of retreat as of 2010. Of course, to be clear, the racial composition gap we are measuring here is between entire cities rather than across borders so it is not directly comparable to the previous analysis. Nevertheless,

³⁷ We exclude any non-redlined city within 50 miles of a redlined city to avoid the possibility that it might have effectively been treated. Our redlining cities were drawn from the 149 cities that were digitized by the University of Richmond's Digital Scholarship Lab and a list of additional HOLC mapped cities from Price Fishback. The additional list resulted in the inclusion of Jamestown, NY and Perth Amboy, NJ. City population size was based on published volumes of the 1930 Census.

the figures are striking and we believe lend additional credence to the economic implications of our baseline boundary findings.³⁸

Moreover, there is little evidence of similar trends at nearby population levels. For example, Figure 9 plots the difference in outcomes between cities just above and below a 25,000 population threshold (and for easy reference, the same calculation for the HOLC 40,000 cutoff).³⁹ Again, assuming that cities on either side of 25,000 would not be systematically different with respect to the outcomes we consider, we expect this exercise to produce roughly a flat line. That is the case with three of four outcomes, and lies in sharp contrast to the patterns observed at the 40,000 cutoff. Homeownership rates increase faster for the 25-35,000 cities relative to the 15-25,000 cities between 1950 and 1970, but this pattern moves in the opposite direction to the larger (redlined) cities relative to the smaller (nonredlined) cities around the 40,000 population threshold.

VI. Discussion

Mechanisms Leading to Urban Disinvestment

The most straightforward explanation of the significant and lasting impact of the HOLC maps is reduced access to credit and higher borrowing costs. Standard theory predicts such conditions reduce the value of homes, which in turn raise the likelihood that

³⁸ The decline in aggregate homeownership may seem surprising given the program's intent to improve the functioning of lending markets. However, in smaller redlined cities, almost 90 percent of census tracts are graded either C or D, where lending was potentially restricted by the maps. Ideally, we would separately compare B, C, and D areas of these cities. Of course, by definition, grades are not available for non-mapped areas. Moreover, many of these small cities were not tracted until as late as 1990, making 1950 to 1980 especially difficult to infer. Instead, we use an ordered probit estimated on the full sample of HOLC cities to predict grades for each 1990 census tract based on 1920 to 1930 trends and 1930 levels of tract characteristics. We then compare the evolution of demographic characteristics in 1940 and 1990 by the predicted grade of the tract. Relative to non-redlined cities, we find share African American grew more in the predicted D and C neighborhoods and less in the predicted B neighborhoods in cities that were redlined, consistent with our other evidence. Unfortunately, results on housing outcomes are too imprecise to draw inferences. That imprecision may be, in part, because the housing effect had dissipated by 1990.

³⁹ As of 1930, there were 103 cities with a population between 25,000 and 35,000 and 257 cities with a population between 15,000 and 25,000. As far as we have been able to ascertain, none of the 360 small cities used for our placebo exercise were redlined. The 25,000 line in Figure 11 plots the mean outcome of the 25-35,000 cities less the mean outcome of the 15-25,000 cities.

property owners with mortgages could be left owing more than the market value of their property (Glaeser and Gyourko 2005). Homes with a market value below replacement costs are in turn much less likely to be maintained and improved (Gyourko and Saiz 2004; Haughwout, Sutherland, and Tracy 2013; Melzer 2017).⁴⁰ Disinvestment in housing occurs when investment in maintenance does not keep pace with depreciation.

Perhaps the strongest evidence of HOLC-related disinvestment is the decline in homeownership, housing values, and rents documented thus far. Other direct measures -- such as the housing vacancy rate, total housing units, and ratings of housing quality -- tend to have flaws for our purpose. Nevertheless, they also are consistent with long-run housing disinvestment in low graded neighborhoods. In particular, we took the 50 redlined cities in which there are census tract housing vacancy data available beginning in 1940. We assume our low propensity score approach in which the parallel trends assumption is fully satisfied for other housing variables would take care of the problem here as well. If so, we find that the D-C gap in vacancy rates increased from 0.1 (0.3) percentage point in 1940 to 0.6 (0.3) percentage points by 1990. Over the same period, the C-B gap increased from 0.2 (0.4) percentage points to 0.7 (0.4) percentage points. A 0.5 percentage point increase explains 8 to 16 percent of the change in vacancy rates in our buffer zones between 1940 and 1990.⁴¹ Further corroborative support of housing disinvestment is in Krimmel (2017), who finds a 20 percent reduction from 1940 to 1970 in the number of housing units in census tracts on the D side of HOLC boundaries relative to tracts on the C side. Finally, the 1960 Census asked directly about housing quality. Conditioning on a rich set of Census income, education, and occupation variables, we

⁴⁰ Moreover, disinvestment may have been exacerbated by the common pre-WWII practice of contract sales in heavily African American neighborhoods (Satter 2009). Individuals who could not obtain mortgages through the formal lending sector, in some cases because of low HOLC grades, may have instead purchased homes by entering into long-term loans known as contract sales. Under these contracts, ownership did not transfer until the final payment was made and failure to meet the terms of the loan at any point could lead residents to lose all equity in the home. Furthermore, contract sales typically had higher implicit interest rates than available in the formal lending sector.

⁴¹ The results are similar using the full sample of borders in the same cities. In 1990, the treated estimates are 0.9 (0.3) and 1.2 (0.3) for the D-C and C-B boundaries and 0.1 (0.3) and 0.5 (0.3) for the D-C and C-B grid-based controls. The mean 1940 vacancy rate is 3.6 and 4.0 percent in D-C and C-B buffer zones. The mean 1990 vacancy rate is 9.8 and 7.1 percent in D-C and C-B buffer zones.

estimate that the rate of deteriorating or dilapidated housing is 6.2 (1.1) pps higher in D than C and B neighborhoods.⁴² Together, we view these suggestive patterns as providing additional empirical support that declining investment caused long-term harm to lower graded neighborhoods after the HOLC maps were drawn.

Possible Explanations for Differences by Border Type

Our housing results, particularly for home ownership, often uncovered larger and more persistent negative effects among C-B borders. Strikingly, some estimated effects reverse course along D-C borders after 1970 or 1980 but not along C-B borders. We can think of at least three possible reasons.

One explanation could be that policies enacted later in the 20th century, such as the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977, designed to address discriminatory housing practices may have successfully targeted D but not C rated areas. CRA instituted a process whereby regulators examine whether banks were providing adequate levels of loans to low and moderate income individuals in the areas they serve. Since low and moderate income individuals are more likely to be in D-graded neighborhoods than C-graded neighborhoods, lending by banks to satisfy CRA compliance could have led to a reduction in home ownership and housing value gaps between D and C areas but less so between C and B areas. However, because CRA was instituted federally and not locally, we cannot convincingly show its passage causally led to the reversal in racial and housing gaps that began sometime in the 1970s.

A second hypothesis is that the effects of the HOLC grades may have had significantly more “bite” in C than D graded neighborhoods. If lending tended to be more restrictive in D than C areas in the pre-map period, the marginal effect of the maps might have been most pronounced in C areas, leading to a larger initial impact on the C-B boundary that also takes longer to dissipate. Relatedly, it may have been the case that the maps revealed more information concerning the long-term prospects of C neighborhoods.

⁴² The mean rate of deteriorating or dilapidated housing in 1960 is 31, 12, and 5 percent in D, C, and B neighborhoods. Of course, we acknowledge that it is difficult to interpret this result without a pre-period.

This is consistent with the fact that the pre-existing gaps between B and C areas were less pronounced than gaps between C and D areas.

A third plausible reason is that D areas were quicker to redevelop, causing D-C gaps to fade faster than C-B gaps. This pattern might arise if D areas are closer to the central business district (CBD), which can lead to earlier gentrification (Brueckner and Rosenthal 2009; Baum-Snow and Hartley 2017). That said, we found mixed evidence that proximity to the CBD played a critical role in the long-run.⁴³ Alternatively, the building stock in D areas may have depreciated more rapidly and was more suitable and less costly to redevelop; this seems consistent with significantly higher levels of older, vacant, and deteriorating and dilapidated properties in D neighborhoods by mid-century.

Population Dynamics by Race

We find strong evidence both in our border design experiments and city discontinuity design that the HOLC maps affected the rise and eventual decline of urban racial segregation during the post WWII period. There are several factors potentially driving this phenomena. One possibility is that receiving a low grade could have made a neighborhood less desirable for *every* household in the area but if black households have fewer outside options, they end up predominantly moving to (and staying in) low graded areas. In this case, older housing units would “filter down” to African Americans (Rosenthal 2014). Alternatively, it could be that a lack of credit access is less relevant for black households than for white households. This distinction could arise because many more black households had insufficient resources to purchase a house and would have been renters in any case, or perhaps because black households faced other barriers to credit even if they lived in higher graded neighborhoods and therefore did not have a differential loss by moving to a D neighborhood. Both explanations, which we cannot

⁴³ We divided the sample into terciles by distance to the CBD of the city. We then compared the first tercile to a sample combining the second and third terciles. We find suggestive evidence that the effects on segregation from 1950 to 1980 were larger along borders that were closer to the CBD. However, that difference disappears by 1990 to 2010, suggesting any gentrification effect related to proximity to the CBD happened later in the century.

separate, would suggest a pickup in black inflows was driving the maps' impact on racial segregation. On the other hand, the maps may have also acted as a coordination mechanism for the outward expansion of African American neighborhoods by lowering home values in primarily white neighborhoods that were near African American neighborhoods. This may have amplified the well-known phenomenon of white flight.⁴⁴

In Figure 10, we decompose the extent to which the maps' impact on rising segregation was driven by white outflow or black inflow. We find that the population flows responsible for the increase in share African American vary by border type.⁴⁵ A combination of increased white outflow and black inflow boosted the share African American along D-C borders (Panels B and C). In total, while black inflow initially increased the *overall* population density along the D side of the D-C boundaries (Panel A), ultimately population density reverted in subsequent decades as white flight commenced and black inflow slowed. Panel D shows that the population dynamics of immigrants followed a similar pattern as that of whites.

On the other hand, the rising share of African-Americans along the C-B borders is driven entirely by increased and persistent inflows of African American residents (Panel F). If anything, there is evidence of a relative inflow of white population along the C side compared to the B side in 1950 (Panel G), although that reverts by 1960, when African American population density begins to increase on the C side. Therefore, white flight appears to be associated with the redlined but not yellow-lined boundaries.

We also examined whether there were especially large changes in racial gaps that might occur if there were tipping points, as in Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008). We found that to be the case, whether measured by indicators of whether African American share is at least 50, 75, or 90 percent, along both D-C and C-B boundaries. This result

⁴⁴ There is a vast literature that discusses the importance of urban white flight on racial segregation. Recent studies include Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008), Boustan (2010), and Shertzer and Walsh (2018).

⁴⁵ We measure the across border differences in *density* rather than population *levels* to account for the different units of geography available in each census.

suggests that our mean racial gap estimates conceal an even larger impact on the upper tail of the racial gap distribution.

City Heterogeneity

We find substantial heterogeneity across cities and, in the Appendix, make a preliminary effort to try to associate this heterogeneity with pre-existing differences in bank competition, the relative coarseness of boundaries (fewer borders might make the maps less effective), city size, and the level of inflows of blacks due to the Great Migration. We find no compelling evidence that these factors played an economically important role in mediating the effects but we think more research is needed to explore these and other possible channels.

Back-of-the-Envelope Economic Impact

Finally, to provide a sense of the relative economic importance of the maps, we calculated how much our estimates could account for the overall gaps between different HOLC neighborhood grades (not just narrowly across boundary buffer zones). In particular, we divided our low propensity boundary estimates by the full neighborhood estimates for share African-American, home ownership, and house values, for each border type and by two time periods (1950 to 1980 and 1990 to 2010).⁴⁶ Overall, we conclude that the maps account for between 15 to 30 percent of the overall gap in share African American and home ownership over the 1950 to 1980 period and 40 percent of the gap in house values. If we focus just on the C versus B neighborhoods over the 1950-1980 period, the maps account for roughly half of the homeownership and house value gaps.⁴⁷ After 1980, our estimates decline in magnitude and therefore account for 0 to 20 percent of the D-C and C-B gap in each of our outcomes.

⁴⁶ We concentrate on the low propensity specifications because of the lack of a pre-trend. Nevertheless, to be conservative, we still subtract out the 1930 estimate.

⁴⁷ There are very few African Americans in C-B neighborhoods until 1960, making it somewhat difficult to interpret this calculation for share African American, at least until later years.

VII. Conclusion

In response to the Great Depression, the Federal Government fundamentally reshaped the nature of housing finance to stabilize housing markets and support the lending industry. A slew of new federal agencies were created including the FHLBB, and, under its auspices, the HOLC. Among their many initiatives, the FHLBB directed the HOLC to create a systematic and uniform scientific property appraisal process and to produce residential security maps for all major cities. Some have argued that these initiatives had a profound and long-lasting influence on the real estate industry by initiating the so-called practice of “redlining.” The residential security maps, which explicitly took into account demographic characteristics (e.g. race, ethnicity) of entire neighborhoods, were drawn for the purpose of influencing the property appraisal process. This in turn may have influenced lending as well as the provision of federal mortgage insurance. Evidence from Baltimore shows a drop in private lending and FHA mortgage insurance in low-graded neighborhoods immediately after the city’s map was drawn.

We attempt to identify the causal effects of the HOLC maps on neighborhood development from 1940 through 2010. A major challenge for our analysis is that the maps were not exogenous and instead likely reflected existing neighborhood differences and trends. Therefore, there is a concern that the evolution of gaps in the post-map period may have reflected practices that would have occurred even in the absence of the maps. To address these challenges, we use a variety of empirical approaches including the use of counterfactual boundaries that experienced the same pre-existing trends but where the HOLC did not ultimately draw borders. We also employ borders that may have been chosen for idiosyncratic reasons and where endogeneity is much less of a concern. Finally, we exploit a discontinuity in the HOLC’s decision to only create maps for cities with a population above 40,000.

Using these approaches, we consistently find a significant and persistent causal effect of the HOLC maps on the racial composition and housing development of urban neighborhoods. These patterns are consistent with the hypothesis that the maps led to

reduced credit access and higher borrowing costs which, in turn, contributed to disinvestment in poor urban American neighborhoods with long-run repercussions. We show that being on the lower graded side of D-C boundaries led to rising racial segregation from 1930 until about 1970 or 1980 before starting to decline thereafter. We also find this same pattern along C-B borders, revealing for the first time that “yellow-lining” was also an important phenomenon. That the pattern begins to revert starting in the 1970s is at least suggestive that federal interventions like the Fair Housing Act of 1968, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, and the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 may have played a role in reversing the increase in segregation caused by the HOLC maps. Nevertheless, racial segregation along both the C-B and D-C borders remains in 2010, almost three quarters of a century later. Moreover, we also find that the maps had sizable effects on homeownership rates, house values and rents. Intriguingly, the effects on homeownership, and to a somewhat lesser extent house values, dissipate over time along the D-C boundaries but remain highly persistent along the C-B boundaries. We believe our results highlight the key role that access to credit plays on the growth and long-running development of local communities.

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
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
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Figure 1: Mortgage Originations in Baltimore, by HOLC Grade

Panel A: All Mortgage Originations, 1% Random Sample of Census Tracts



Panel B: FHA-Insured Mortgages, 100% Population



Notes: Panel A plots mortgage originations by HOLC grade from a 1 percent sample of Baltimore census tracts. The data is normalized so that the 1926 to 1928 average is equal to 100 percent. Panel B reports the number of FHA-insured mortgages written between 1935 and 1937 and between 1938 and 1940 in all Baltimore census tracts, again stratified by HOLC grade. Both data are from the archival work of Jonathan Rose.

Figure 2: Geographic Coverage of Digitized HOLC Maps






Figure 3: HOLC Maps for Chicago, New York, and San Francisco


A. Chicago



B. New York



C. San Francisco




HOLC Grades (in order of riskiness):

- A=Green (least)
- B=Blue
- C=Yellow
- D=red (most)
- Not colored=unclassified


Notes: Maps digitized by the Digital Scholarship Lab at the University of Richmond.

Figure 4: Mean Outcomes, by HOLC Neighborhood Grade and Time


Panel A: Share African American




Panel C: Home Values



Panel B: Home Ownership



Panel D: Rent




—A—B—C—D


Notes: Panels A to D plot summary statistics by HOLC grade over the period 1910-2010. Colors represent those used in the HOLC maps. Summary statistics are weighted by neighborhood population. Data is drawn from the full-count U.S. Census (1910-1940), Census tracts (1950-1980), and Census blocks and block groups (1990-2010). House values and rents are in \$2010. See text for more detail.

Figure 5: Main Effects along D-C Boundaries, by Outcome


Panel A: Share African American




Panel B: Home Ownership



Panel C: Log House Values



Panel D: Log Rent




— Treated — Comparison


Notes: The treatment estimates (blue lines) are derived from a ¼ mile buffer zone around the D-C boundaries. The comparison boundaries are based on a ¼ mile buffer zone drawn around grids over each city and weighted by propensity scores to mirror pre-map trends (see text for more detail). Vertical bands denote 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6: Main Effects along C-B Boundaries, by Outcome


Panel A: Share African American




Panel B: Home Ownership



Panel C: Log House Values



Panel D: Log Rent




— Treated — Comparison


Notes: See notes to Figure 5.

Figure 7: Effects on D-C and C-B Gaps, Using Low Propensity for Treatment Boundaries


Panel A: Share African American, D-C




Panel E: Share African American, C-B




Panel B: Home Ownership, D-C




Panel F: Home Ownership, C-B




Panel C: Log House Values, D-C




Panel G: Log House Values, C-B



Panel D: Log Rent, D-C



Panel H: Log Rent, C-B




— Low Propensity Treated — All Treated


Note: The “low propensity treated” sample is restricted to boundaries with below median propensity scores. See notes to Figure 5.

Figure 8: Comparison of Redlined versus Non-Redlined Cities Using 40,000 Population Cutoff


Panel A: Share African American




Panel C: Median House Value



Panel B: Home Ownership Rate




Panel D: Log Median Rent




Notes: The red line shows trends in outcomes for 27 redlined cities with populations between 40,000 and 50,000 in 1930. The blue line shows trends in outcomes for 26 non-redlined cities with a population between 30,000 and 40,000 in 1930 that were located at least 50 miles away from the closest redlined city. The sample of non-redlined cities was constructed using published volumes of the 1930 U.S. Census. All estimates are normalized to equal zero in 1930 and house values and rents are in \$2010.

Figure 9: City Outcomes Using a Placebo 25,000 Population Cutoff


Panel A: Share African American




Panel C: Log Median House Value



Panel B: Home Ownership Rate




Panel D: Log Median Rent




Notes: The red lines show the difference in trends between 27 redlined cities with populations between 40,000 and 50,000 in 1930 and 26 non-redlined cities with populations between 30,000 and 40,000 in 1930 (the differences between the lines in Figure 8). The blue lines show the difference in trends between 103 cities with populations between 25,000 and 35,000 in 1930 and 257 cities with populations between 15,000 and 25,000 in 1930. The trends are normalized to zero in 1930, and house values and rents are in \$2010. See the text for additional details. Population data was drawn from published volumes of the 1930 U.S. Census.

Figure 10: Population Dynamics along the D-C and C-B Boundaries


Panel A: Gap in Population Density, D-C




Panel E: Gap in Population Density, C-B




Panel B: Gap in Black Density, D-C




Panel F: Gap in Black Density, C-B




Panel C: Gap in White Density, D-C




Panel G: Gap in White Density, C-B



Panel D: Gap in Foreign Born Share, D-C



Panel H: Gap in Foreign Born Share, C-B



— Treated — Comparison

Notes: See notes to Figure 5.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Sample Type		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
		Full HOLC Neighborhoods				Boundary Buffer Zones				Buffer Gaps	
Grade		A	B	C	D	C-B Borders		D-C Borders		C-B	D-C
N		543	1,351	2,156	1,399	1,965	1,965	2,111	2,111	1,965	2,111
<u>Panel A.</u>		year									
Share	1910	0.023	0.018	0.019	0.063	0.019	0.014	0.027	0.060	-0.005	0.034
African	1920	0.017	0.008	0.013	0.075	0.008	0.009	0.020	0.063	0.001	0.043
American	1930	0.015	0.007	0.015	0.146	0.008	0.012	0.025	0.097	0.004	0.072
	1940	0.010	0.005	0.016	0.179	0.006	0.010	0.029	0.121	0.004	0.092
	1950	0.007	0.008	0.031	0.300	0.006	0.039	0.055	0.226	0.033	0.171
	1960	0.009	0.034	0.123	0.396	0.080	0.112	0.218	0.371	0.033	0.153
	1970	0.064	0.132	0.234	0.456	0.168	0.225	0.313	0.469	0.057	0.156
	1980	0.144	0.243	0.307	0.462	0.312	0.305	0.373	0.494	-0.006	0.121
	1990	0.141	0.251	0.309	0.430	0.342	0.351	0.397	0.443	0.009	0.046
	2000	0.178	0.276	0.320	0.412	0.365	0.365	0.401	0.431	0.000	0.030
	2010	0.173	0.261	0.290	0.357	0.324	0.331	0.355	0.386	0.007	0.031
<u>Panel B.</u>											
Home	1910	0.453	0.540	0.451	0.289	0.564	0.481	0.441	0.374	-0.082	-0.067
Ownership	1920	0.599	0.608	0.492	0.326	0.600	0.535	0.467	0.395	-0.064	-0.072
Rate	1930	0.643	0.523	0.436	0.291	0.482	0.433	0.403	0.350	-0.049	-0.052
	1940	0.660	0.505	0.410	0.288	0.441	0.394	0.362	0.311	-0.047	-0.051
	1950	0.627	0.491	0.421	0.267	0.361	0.298	0.359	0.292	-0.064	-0.067
	1960	0.661	0.526	0.451	0.297	0.395	0.324	0.362	0.300	-0.071	-0.062
	1970	0.638	0.504	0.426	0.299	0.337	0.286	0.337	0.284	-0.051	-0.053
	1980	0.650	0.493	0.416	0.309	0.336	0.287	0.348	0.290	-0.049	-0.058
	1990	0.750	0.540	0.441	0.348	0.429	0.360	0.365	0.336	-0.070	-0.029
	2000	0.748	0.533	0.436	0.352	0.425	0.357	0.359	0.336	-0.068	-0.023
	2010	0.748	0.524	0.421	0.340	0.410	0.346	0.339	0.316	-0.064	-0.023
<u>Panel C.</u>											
Home	1930	297	160	113	111	168	129	112	102	-38	-10
Value	1940	163	95	67	55	93	77	63	56	-16	-7
(1000s)	1950	158	130	100	78	128	116	92	76	-12	-16
	1960	181	127	105	93	127	121	102	88	-6	-14
	1970	172	119	104	74	124	113	95	78	-11	-17
	1980	209	134	108	82	133	116	104	77	-17	-27
	1990	357	249	196	193	241	227	189	178	-14	-10
	2000	441	288	217	241	263	243	211	192	-20	-20
	2010	230	181	161	181	182	176	165	173	-6	8

Table 1: Summary Statistics, cont.

Sample Type		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5) (6) (7) (8)				(9)	(10)
		Full				Boundary Buffer Zones				Buffer Gaps	
		HOLC Neighborhoods				C-B Borders		D-C Borders			
Grade		A	B	C	D	B	C	C	D	C-B	D-C
<i>N</i>		<i>543</i>	<i>1,351</i>	<i>2,156</i>	<i>1,399</i>	<i>1,965</i>	<i>1,965</i>	<i>2,111</i>	<i>2,111</i>	<i>1,965</i>	<i>2,111</i>
<u>Panel D.</u>	year										
Rent	1930	887	689	520	419	1,073	913	847	821	-159	-26
	1940	937	777	721	627	1,645	1,768	1,218	1,072	123	-146
	1950	733	548	433	333	506	462	407	340	-45	-67
	1960	742	603	503	410	571	534	493	436	-37	-57
	1970	885	662	582	480	621	589	534	480	-32	-54
	1980	770	620	541	461	586	557	506	453	-29	-53
	1990	974	779	693	609	707	690	631	598	-17	-33
	2000	1,053	814	722	679	742	724	678	644	-18	-34
	2010	1,117	955	880	889	897	884	862	844	-13	-18
<u>Panel E.</u>											
Share	1910	0.305	0.194	0.205	0.268	0.175	0.184	0.198	0.211	0.008	0.014
Foreign	1920	0.203	0.152	0.182	0.237	0.143	0.159	0.180	0.197	0.016	0.017
Born	1930	0.157	0.166	0.205	0.243	0.181	0.199	0.208	0.220	0.017	0.013
	1940	0.100	0.134	0.162	0.172	0.148	0.161	0.163	0.164	0.013	0.001
	1950	0.132	0.155	0.157	0.128	0.171	0.178	0.154	0.141	0.008	-0.013
	1960	0.113	0.141	0.132	0.099	0.156	0.152	0.127	0.104	-0.003	-0.023
	1970	0.090	0.121	0.118	0.086	0.146	0.145	0.109	0.086	-0.001	-0.023
	1980	0.095	0.140	0.145	0.116	0.177	0.186	0.121	0.113	0.009	-0.008
	1990	0.121	0.243	0.298	0.246	0.282	0.303	0.198	0.195	0.021	-0.004
	2000	0.103	0.181	0.222	0.195	0.211	0.237	0.191	0.201	0.025	0.010
	2010	0.107	0.188	0.238	0.217	0.221	0.244	0.204	0.217	0.023	0.013
<u>Panel F.</u>											
Credit	1999	709	674	653	640	659	651	641	634	-8	-6
Score	2016	729	692	671	662	682	675	665	662	-6	-3
Fraction	1999	0.122	0.218	0.306	0.384	0.246	0.286	0.373	0.418	0.040	0.046
Subprime	2016	0.105	0.173	0.232	0.281	0.19	0.199	0.252	0.257	0.009	0.004

Note: Data for Panels A to E are drawn from the full-counts of the 1910 to 1940 Censuses, the census tract aggregation of the 1950 to 1980 Censuses, and the census block and block group aggregations of the 1990 to 2010 Censuses. Panel F data is from the New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel. Columns (1) to (4) report averages by full HOLC grades. Columns (5) to (8) report averages for each side of the C-B and D-C buffer zones. Columns (9) and (10) report the simple difference or gap between each side of a border type (e.g. column (9) = Column (6) - Column (5)).

Table 2: Effects of D Versus C grade, Share African Americans

Sample Type	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	HOLC Neighborhoods		1/4 Mile D-C Boundaries				
Year	D-C	D-C	D-C	D-C	Grid C.F's	Triple Diff	Low PS D-C
1910	0.061 (0.011)	0.053 (0.01)	0.026 (0.005)	0.025 (0.006)	0.021 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.008)	0.006 (0.004)
1920	0.069 (0.009)	0.063 (0.008)	0.030 (0.006)	0.029 (0.006)	0.024 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.009)	0.003 (0.004)
1930	0.135 (0.014)	0.133 (0.013)	0.063 (0.01)	0.062 (0.011)	0.054 (0.012)	-- --	0.007 (0.004)
1940	0.150 (0.015)	0.147 (0.013)	0.076 (0.012)	0.073 (0.012)	0.040 (0.009)	0.026 (0.006)	0.020 (0.007)
1950	0.224 (0.02)	0.214 (0.019)	0.119 (0.026)	0.101 (0.024)	0.010 (0.011)	0.083 (0.025)	0.042 (0.018)
1960	0.250 (0.021)	0.234 (0.018)	0.121 (0.031)	0.094 (0.026)	0.000 (0.016)	0.086 (0.03)	0.044 (0.015)
1970	0.216 (0.024)	0.203 (0.02)	0.138 (0.027)	0.113 (0.023)	-0.007 (0.016)	0.112 (0.031)	0.091 (0.021)
1980	0.172 (0.028)	0.159 (0.023)	0.107 (0.028)	0.087 (0.021)	0.003 (0.02)	0.076 (0.025)	0.061 (0.022)
1990	0.130 (0.018)	0.126 (0.014)	0.059 (0.011)	0.056 (0.011)	0.016 (0.007)	0.032 (0.013)	0.033 (0.01)
2000	0.106 (0.017)	0.103 (0.013)	0.042 (0.01)	0.038 (0.01)	0.010 (0.005)	0.019 (0.011)	0.019 (0.008)
2010	0.081 (0.016)	0.079 (0.012)	0.037 (0.008)	0.034 (0.007)	0.006 (0.005)	0.019 (0.012)	0.017 (0.008)
<i>Cities</i>	<i>148</i>	<i>148</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>97</i>
<i>Neighborhoods</i>	<i>3532</i>	<i>3555</i>	<i>--</i>	<i>--</i>	<i>--</i>	<i>--</i>	<i>--</i>
<i>Boundaries</i>	<i>--</i>	<i>--</i>	<i>--</i>	<i>1,133</i>	<i>4,214</i>	<i>5,347</i>	<i>567</i>
<i>N</i>	<i>27,814</i>	<i>27,814</i>	<i>16,676</i>	<i>16,676</i>	<i>61,415</i>	<i>78,091</i>	<i>8,519</i>
<i>R2</i>	<i>0.215</i>	<i>0.383</i>	<i>0.426</i>	<i>0.645</i>	<i>0.683</i>	<i>0.675</i>	<i>0.647</i>
<i>F.E.</i>	<i>None</i>	<i>City</i>	<i>City</i>	<i>Bound.</i>	<i>Bound.</i>	<i>Bound.</i>	<i>Bound.</i>

Note: Table entries are from regressions that estimate the gaps between D and C rated neighborhoods in the share African American. Columns (1) and (2) use entire neighborhoods. Columns (3) to (7) use 1/4 mile boundary buffer zones. Columns (3) and (4) use actual HOLC "treated" boundaries. Column (5) shows effects on counterfactual boundaries weighted by propensity scores to be similar to treated boundaries. Column (6) shows the difference in the gap between treated and comparison boundaries relative to 1930. Column (7) uses only those treated boundaries with below median propensity scores.

APPENDIX: NOT FOR PUBLICATION

Appendix

More Detail on Construction of Census Housing Variables

Whenever possible, we attempt to use consistently defined census variables from 1910 to 2010. Typically, this means relying on the version of the data cleaned and coded by IPUMS. However, we must occasionally deviate from IPUMS with regard to house values, monthly contract rent, and vacancy rates. For 1930 and 1940, we trim the bottom and top 1 percent of the national house value and rent distribution separately for each census out of concern about extreme outliers. In 1950, census tract tabulations report monthly contract rents and house values in bins. We use these bins to calculate a mean by assuming that the mean of each bin is equal to its midpoint. For the highest bin, we assume that its mean is equal to 1.5 times its lower bound. We repeat this procedure for 1960 house values. In 1970 and 1980, we calculate mean house value and mean monthly contract rent by dividing the aggregates of these variables by the number of owner-occupied units with house value reported and by the number of renter-occupied units with non-zero contract rent, respectively. For our vacancy rates, we use number of “dwelling” units in 1940 and number of “housing” units in 1990.

HOLC Grade Determinants

Appendix Table A7 shows a series of regressions that associate neighborhood grades with pre-HOLC 1930 housing and demographic characteristics, as well as changes between 1920 and 1930 when available. Columns (1) and (2) report marginal effects from an ordered logit where D is coded as 4 and A is coded as 1. Columns (3) to (8) are marginal effects of the probability of moving one grade lower: i.e. from A to B, from B to C, or from C to D, respectively. All specifications include city fixed effects and are weighted by the log of neighborhood population in 1930. Standard errors are clustered at the city level.

Like Hillier (2005) and Fishback (2014), who were only able to examine single cities, we find a clear monotonic relationship between grades and nearly all the key economic and housing covariates that are available in the census whether considered individually or, as in the table, simultaneously.⁴⁸ Unsurprisingly, a higher homeownership rate, log home value, log rent,

⁴⁸ We find weaker evidence that recent changes in housing and household characteristics between 1920 and 1930 affected HOLC grades. These coefficients are suppressed in Table 2 for space but are available on request. However,

occupational earnings, radio ownership, and literacy are associated with a higher HOLC grade. To take one example, the results in column (2) imply that a 10 percentage point increase in homeownership rates raises the probability of a being assigned one letter grade higher by 7.6 (0.7) percentage points. These results are unsurprising because they conform with what we know about the appraisal process from the detailed forms, called area description files (ADF), that were recorded at the time. The ADFs consistently document that homeownership, vacancy, housing age, housing quality, and economic and demographic characteristics of neighbors were key factors used to grade neighborhoods.

Appendix Table A7 also shows that the marginal effect of most of our observable housing and employment variables is roughly the same for grade determination between B versus C (columns 5 and 6) and C versus D (columns 3 and 4). For example, in the sample of C and D neighborhoods, a 10 percentage point increase in the homeownership rate increases the probability of a C grade by 4.5 (0.5) percentage points. Likewise, in the C-B sample, a 10 percentage point increase in the homeownership rate increases the probability of a B grade by 4.8 (0.6) percentage points.

The case of race is somewhat more complicated. Similar to previous studies, we show that a neighborhood is more likely to be graded D than C if the African-American share is higher, even after conditioning on a set of housing and economic characteristics and city fixed effects. To highlight the pivotal role of race in grading D neighborhoods, Appendix Figure A1 shows the ADF for a particular neighborhood in Tacoma, Washington which was graded D. The notes at the bottom of the document clarify: “This might be classed as a ‘low yellow’ area if not for the presence of the number of Negroes and low class foreign families who reside in the area.” It is worth noting that the fraction of African Americans in this Tacoma neighborhood was 2 percent. However, interestingly, the share African-American has the opposite effect when we examine grade determination among A versus B neighborhoods and B versus C neighborhoods. That is, B grades are more likely than C grades, and A grades are more likely than B grades, in areas with a higher share of African Americans.

it is plausible that changes between 1920 and 1930 are not the correct time frame for evaluating appraisals that were taking place in the mid-1930s.

City Heterogeneity

We next document significant heterogeneous effects across cities. In addition to its descriptive value, the variation in the magnitude of the causal effects has the potential to shed light on possible mechanisms. That said, there are some clear limitations to cutting the data by city. Many of our 149 cities have too few D-C and C-B boundaries to reliably estimate a city-specific effect. Consequently, we limit this analysis to cities with at least 5 D-C or C-B borders. For the 1950-1980 and 1990-2010 periods, that allows us to produce estimates for up to 51 and 80 cities, respectively.⁴⁹ Related, constructing comparison boundaries within a specific city has proven infeasible given the limited number of potential boundaries. Instead, we examine treated boundaries and assume that there are no effects on the comparison boundaries based on the national evidence.

Those important caveats aside, we find the D-C gaps in share African American between 1950 and 1980 (Appendix Table A9 column 1) vary from 3 pps in Chicago to 9 pps in St. Louis to 21 pps in Detroit, to take a few large Midwestern cities where the estimates are relatively more precise as examples. The comparable gaps in some Southern and Rust Belt cities (Birmingham, AL; Columbus, OH; Erie, PA; Evansville IN, Lexington KY; Mobile, AL and Toledo, OH) exceed 40 pps. By 1990 to 2010, these gaps have fallen considerably but some of the same cities continue to have the largest racial gaps along the D-C border. Along the C-B boundaries (Appendix Tables A9 and A10, column 2), we tend to see the largest African American share effects among Northeastern and Midwest cities, including St. Louis, New York, and Philadelphia. Appendix Tables A9 and A10 also report similar sized variation in city-specific estimates of homeownership, house values, and rent.

We considered several possible sources of this heterogeneity but, in the end, have been unable to find a compelling explanation. First, using 1930 county-level data on banks per capita, we tested whether larger HOLC effects appear in cities with less lending sector competition and therefore possibly greater banker discretion.⁵⁰ Second, we examined whether the coarseness of

⁴⁹ The precise number of cities depends on the outcome and the boundary type. The number of boundaries per city are shown in Appendix Table A8.

⁵⁰ We thank Price Fishback for the county bank data. It is available here: <https://econ.arizona.edu/weather-demography-economy-and-new-deal-county-level-1930-1940>. We correlated these measures with each of our outcomes for each border type at long time intervals.

boundaries in a city influenced the size of the effects. For example, perhaps cities which had fewer borders, like Chicago and its vast swath of red surrounded by a ring of yellow (Figure 3), were less able to use the maps to promote lending practices. Third, we explored whether the effects differed by city size. In all three cases, we found no consistent patterns.⁵¹

Lastly, the drawing of the maps and their aftermath coincide with the Great Migration of Southern blacks to Northern cities. Therefore, we considered whether our race results in particular might have been influenced by this major historical event. Perhaps cities where there were large inflows of African Americans were more prone to reacting through discriminatory practices. To address, this possibility, we use our city estimates for 1950-1980 and 1990-2010 and examine whether the gaps in the share African American across borders were systematically different across Northern cities depending on African American inflow during the Great Migration. We found mixed patterns depending on the border type and years considered. The most compelling evidence was a statistically significant negative correlation between black inflow and white population density gaps along D-C borders, a result that appears consistent with Boustan (2010). However, this association does not translate into a statistically significant correlation between Great Migration inflows and our estimated D-C gaps in the share of African Americans.

⁵¹ Along the C-B borders there were some outcomes in some periods where the differences were statistically significant by city size, but these also could have been due to chance.

Appendix Figure A1: Area Description File for Tacoma, Washington

FORM 8
10-1-37

AREA DESCRIPTION - SECURITY MAP OF Tacoma

1. AREA CHARACTERISTICS:

a. Description of Terrain. Low lying level.

b. Favorable Influences. Schools, churches, stores and transportation conveniently available.

c. Detrimental Influences. Unimproved streets - Heterogeneous population.

d. Percentage of land improved 50 %; e. Trend of desirability next 10-15 yrs. Static

2. INHABITANTS:

a. Occupation Laborers; b. Estimated annual family income \$ 1000 to \$ 1800

c. Foreign-born families few %; American born predominating; d. Negro Yes; 2 %

e. Infiltration of Lower classes slowly; f. Relief families Many

g. Population is increasing Slowly; decreasing ----; static ----

3. BUILDINGS:


	PREDOMINATING	90 %	OTHER TYPE	10 %	OTHER TYPE	%
a. Type	<u>4 & 5 room</u>		<u>Miscellaneous</u>			
b. Construction	<u>frame</u>					
c. Average Age	<u>15</u> Years		<u> </u> Years		<u> </u> Years	
d. Repair	<u>poor to fair</u>					
e. Occupancy	<u>95</u> %		<u> </u> %		<u> </u> %	
f. Home ownership	<u>50</u> %		<u> </u> %		<u> </u> %	
g. Constructed past yr.	<u>None</u>					
h. 1929 Price range	\$ <u>1000</u> to \$ <u>2500</u>	<u>100</u> %	\$ <u> </u>	<u>100</u> %	\$ <u> </u>	<u>100</u> %
i. 1933 Price range	\$ <u>500</u> to \$ <u>1500</u>	<u>60</u> %	\$ <u> </u>	<u> </u> %	\$ <u> </u>	<u> </u> %
j. 1937 Price range	\$ <u>800</u> to \$ <u>2000</u>	<u>80</u> %	\$ <u> </u>	<u> </u> %	\$ <u> </u>	<u> </u> %
k. Sales demand	\$ <u>1500</u> - fair		\$ <u> </u>		\$ <u> </u>	
l. Activity	<u>fair</u>					
m. 1929 Rent range	\$ <u>10</u> to \$ <u>25</u>	<u>100</u> %	\$ <u> </u>	<u>100</u> %	\$ <u> </u>	<u>100</u> %
n. 1933 Rent range	\$ <u>5.00</u> to \$ <u>12</u>	<u>50</u> %	\$ <u> </u>	<u> </u> %	\$ <u> </u>	<u> </u> %
o. 1937 Rent range	\$ <u>12</u> to \$ <u>20</u>	<u>95</u> %	\$ <u> </u>	<u> </u> %	\$ <u> </u>	<u> </u> %
p. Rental demand	\$ <u>15</u> <u>good</u>		\$ <u> </u>		\$ <u> </u>	
q. Activity	<u>good</u>					

4. AVAILABILITY OF MORTGAGE FUNDS: a. Home purchase limited; b. Home building limited

5. CLARIFYING REMARKS: This might be classed as a 'Low Yellow' area were it not for the presence of the number of Negroes and low class Foreign families who reside in the area. Lot values run from \$2.00 to \$5.00 per front foot.

6. NAME AND LOCATION Tacoma SECURITY GRADE D AREA NO. 7


Appendix Figure A2: Boundary Buffer Zones for New York City




Notes: This map provides a visual depiction of the “boundary buffer zones” in part of New York City that form the main unit of our analysis. Areas shaded in red, yellow, blue, and green constitute D, C, B, and A graded neighborhoods. The thick black lines denote straight-line neighborhood boundaries that are at least 1/4 mile in length. The lighter black lines outline the 1/4-mile buffer zones surrounding each boundary.

Appendix Figure A3: Distance Plots around HOLC Borders, 1930


Panel A: African American Share, D-C




Panel B: African American Share, C-B



Panel C: Home Ownership, D-C




Panel D: Home Ownership, C-B




Appendix Figure A3: Distance Plots around HOLC Borders, 1930, continued


Panel E: House Values, D-C




Panel F: House Values, C-B



Panel G: Rent, D-C




Panel H: Rent, C-B




Notes: These plots illustrate the mean outcome at increments of 1/100 of a mile from an HOLC boundary (the vertical red dotted line). Left (right) of the boundary are the higher (lower) graded neighborhood. Each distance plot was constructed using geocoded individual-level data from the full-count 1930 Census and is regression-adjusted to account for border fixed effects.

Appendix Figure A4: Hypothetical Examples of Missing and Misaligned Borders




Appendix Figure A5: Example of Grid Placed over New York City




Notes: The above map of NYC depicts the initial step in the construction of a set of non-HOLC “grid” comparison boundaries that are weighted to resemble our treated HOLC boundaries before the maps were drawn. To construct our grid boundaries, we drew 1/2-mile by 1/2-mile grids over HOLC cities. We then constructed 1/4-mile buffer zones around each line segment that did not overlap with an HOLC boundary. See Figure A1 for an illustration of these boundary buffer zones.

Appendix Figure A6: Distribution of Propensity Scores and Effects of Re-weighting

Panel A: Propensity Score Distribution, D-C Boundaries




Panel B: Propensity Score Distribution, C-B Boundaries




Appendix Figure A6: Distribution of Propensity Scores and Effects of Re-weighting, cont.

Panel C: Distributions of 1930 Home Ownership Gaps, D-C Boundaries




Panel D: Distributions of 1930 Home Ownership Gaps, C-B Boundaries




Notes: Panels A and B are kernel density plots of our propensity score distributions for D-C and C-B boundaries, respectively. Panels C and D are kernel density plots of the distribution of the 1930 home ownership gaps across D-C and C-B boundaries. In panels C and D, propensity scores are used to weight the grid comparison boundaries (the purple line) such that they mimic the treated (HOLC) D-C and C-B boundaries. Propensity scores are estimated using full-count Census data from 1910, 1920, and 1930.

Appendix Figure A7: Triple Difference D-C Estimates Using Grid and Same Grade Comparisons


Panel A: Share African American




Panel B: Home Ownership



Panel C: Log House Values



Panel D: Log Rent




— Grid — Same Grade


Notes: These figures show triple-difference estimates (treatment minus comparison) using our grid (black) and same-grade (green) comparison borders. The same grade comparisons are based on HOLC boundaries between neighborhoods that received the same grades (D-D, C-C, and B-B). See the text for more detail and the notes to Figure 5. The vertical bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

Appendix Figure A8: Triple Difference C-B Estimates Using Grid and Same Grade Comparisons


Panel A: Share African American




Panel B: Home Ownership



Panel C: Log House Values



Panel D: Log Rent




— Grid — Same Grade


Notes: See notes to Appendix Figure A7.

Appendix Figure 9: Impact on Credit Scores, D-C and C-B Boundaries


Panel A: D-C Gaps in Credit Scores




Panel C: C-B Gaps in Credit Scores



Panel B: D-C Gaps in Subprime



Panel D: C-B Gaps in Subprime




— Treated — Comparison


Notes: Credit scores are from the Federal Reserve Bank of NY Consumer Credit Panel. An individual is classified as subprime if her Equifax Risk Score is less than 620. See notes to Figure 5.

Appendix Figure A10: Distance Plots around HOLC Borders Using Low Propensity Treated, 1930


Panel A: African American Share, D-C




Panel B: African American Share, C-B



Panel C: Home Ownership, D-C




Panel D: Home Ownership, C-B




Appendix Figure A10: Distance Plots Around HOLC Borders Using Low Propensity Treated, 1930, continued


Panel E: House Values, D-C




Panel F: House Values, C-B



Panel G: Rent, D-C




Panel H: Rent, C-B




Note: See notes to Appendix Figure A3.

Appendix Figure 11: Additional Robustness Checks, African American Share


Panel A: 1/8th mile Boundaries, D-C




Panel B: 1/8th mile Boundaries, C-B



Panel C: High Geocoding Rate Cities, D-C




Panel D: High Geocoding Rate Cities, C-B




Appendix Figure 11, continued


Panel E: Excluding Trains and Rivers, D-C




Panel F: Excluding Trains and Rivers, C-B



Panel G: Using Tracts in All Years, D-C




Panel H: Using Tracts in All Years, C-B




Notes: In Panels A and B, buffer zones are drawn 1/8 (rather than 1/4) mile around boundaries. In Panels C and D, we select the subset of cities that had a geocoding match rate above the median (59.3 percent) in 1920. In Panels E and F, we exclude boundaries that overlap with trains and rivers. Our rivers and trains shapefiles were obtained from Esri, Geospatial at UCLA and Jeremy Atack of Vanderbilt University, respectively. In Panels G and H, we multiply our headline results by the mean block-to-tract ratio in 1990-2010 to generate “tract-adjusted” estimates (the blue line). See text for more detail.

Appendix Figure A12: Additional Robustness Checks, Home Ownership


Panel A: 1/8th mile Boundaries, D-C




Panel B: 1/8th mile Boundaries, C-B




Panel C: High Geocoding Rate Cities, D-C




Panel D: High Geocoding Rate Cities, C-B




Panel E: Excluding Trains and Rivers, D-C




Panel F: Excluding Trains and Rivers, C-B



Panel G: Using Tracts in All Years, D-C



Panel H: Using Tracts in All Years, C-B




..... Treated, Tract-Adjusted Comparison — Treated, Tracts


Notes: See notes to Appendix Figure A11.

Appendix Figure A13: Additional Robustness Checks, House Values


Panel A: 1/8th mile Boundaries, D-C




Panel B: 1/8th mile Boundaries, C-B




Panel C: High Geocoding Rate Cities, D-C




Panel D: High Geocoding Rate Cities, C-B




Panel E: Excluding Trains and Rivers, D-C




Panel F: Excluding Trains and Rivers, C-B



Panel G: Using Tracts in All Years, D-C



Panel H: Using Tracts in All Years, C-B




..... Treated, Tract-Adjusted Comparison — Treated, Tracts


Notes: See notes to Appendix Figure A11.

Appendix Figure A14: Additional Robustness Checks, Rent


Panel A: 1/8th mile Boundaries, D-C




Panel B: 1/8th mile Boundaries, C-B




Panel C: High Geocoding Rate Cities, D-C




Panel D: High Geocoding Rate Cities, C-B




Panel E: Excluding Trains and Rivers, D-C




Panel F: Excluding Trains and Rivers, C-B



Panel G: Using Tracts in All Years, D-C



Panel H: Using Tracts in All Years, C-B



..... Treated, Tract-Adjusted Comparison — Treated, Tracts

Note: See note to Appendix Figure A11.

Table A1: City Characteristics, 1930

City	1930 Census Variables													
	Pop'n geo'd	Share AA	Home Own	House Values	Share FB	Radio Own	Att. School	Lab F Part.	Rent	Occ. Score	Earn Score	Educ Score	Emp. Rate	Read or Write
Akron, OH	188,793	0.04	0.54	6174	0.13	0.53	0.63	0.60	53	25	51	14	0.82	0.98
Albany, NY	107,893	0.02	0.40	10432	0.14	0.58	0.63	0.60	74	26	55	17	0.84	0.99
Altoona, PA	70,209	0.01	0.61	5449	0.07	0.45	0.61	0.52	54	27	59	14	0.81	0.98
Arlington, MA	31,589	0.00	0.56	9723	0.22	0.74	0.62	0.55	65	28	57	21	0.84	0.99
Asheville, NC	35,807	0.24	0.40	7839	0.02	0.32	0.59	0.61	56	24	46	17	0.80	0.97
Atlanta, GA	161,227	0.27	0.35	6780	0.02	0.31	0.61	0.63	46	24	47	16	0.84	0.97
Atlantic City, NJ	46,508	0.23	0.30	19838	0.16	0.57	0.64	0.63	79	23	43	14	0.81	0.98
Augusta, GA	43,210	0.40	0.29	4983	0.01	0.16	0.57	0.65	39	21	41	12	0.83	0.93
Aurora, IL	39,485	0.02	0.66	6641	0.13	0.71	0.62	0.57	81	26	55	15	0.80	0.98
Baltimore, MD	635,110	0.16	0.56	5421	0.09	0.52	0.56	0.62	53	25	50	14	0.85	0.97
Battle Creek, MI	25,244	0.03	0.60	5845	0.08	0.53	0.63	0.60	72	26	55	15	0.82	0.99
Bay City, MI	36,733	0.00	0.71	2974	0.14	0.49	0.64	0.55	61	26	54	14	0.73	0.97
Belmont, MA	19,988	0.00	0.54	11678	0.22	0.78	0.64	0.55	50	28	56	24	0.88	0.98
Binghamton, NY	61,732	0.01	0.48	7888	0.13	0.50	0.65	0.63	38	25	51	14	0.84	0.97
Birmingham, AL	194,055	0.35	0.39	6109	0.02	0.31	0.57	0.60	47	24	49	15	0.86	0.95
Boston, MA	514,816	0.03	0.29	8504	0.31	0.56	0.66	0.61	69	25	49	15	0.79	0.96
Braintree, MA	12,568	0.00	0.70	5985	0.18	0.77	0.63	0.55	61	27	57	18	0.87	0.99
Bronx, NY	1,072,492	0.01	0.13	13455	0.38	0.65	0.61	0.60	71	26	54	17	0.83	0.96
Brookline, MA	38,951	0.01	0.38	21847	0.27	0.80	0.73	0.57	146	25	47	23	0.83	1.00
Brooklyn, NY	2,191,580	0.03	0.30	11738	0.34	0.59	0.61	0.60	73	26	53	16	0.82	0.95
Buffalo, NY	507,445	0.02	0.47	8354	0.21	0.56	0.62	0.58	50	26	55	15	0.80	0.98
Cambridge, MA	101,103	0.05	0.28	9470	0.29	0.56	0.63	0.61	43	25	50	16	0.80	0.97
Camden, NJ	100,093	0.09	0.51	4903	0.16	0.54	0.60	0.61	67	25	53	12	0.80	0.95
Canton, OH	83,883	0.02	0.56	6348	0.12	0.51	0.61	0.57	44	26	56	15	0.83	0.97
Charleston, WV	31,078	0.11	0.40	10311	0.03	0.46	0.63	0.59	44	26	51	20	0.84	0.98
Charlotte, NC	44,003	0.26	0.35	8803	0.01	0.37	0.53	0.64	51	23	45	15	0.84	0.93
Chattanooga, TN	81,609	0.23	0.36	5638	0.01	0.24	0.54	0.61	31	24	49	14	0.85	0.96
Chelsea, MA	39,184	0.01	0.33	6906	0.38	0.51	0.63	0.58	46	26	52	13	0.79	0.93
Chicago, IL	2,416,387	0.07	0.38	9346	0.26	0.64	0.62	0.61	89	25	53	14	0.80	0.97
Chicopee, MA	40,247	0.00	0.46	5822	0.28	0.44	0.62	0.62	27	25	51	10	0.80	0.95

Table A1: City Characteristics, 1930

City	1930 Census Variables													
	Pop'n geo'd	Share AA	Home Own	House Values	Share FB	Radio Own	Att. School	Lab F Part.	Rent	Occ. Score	Earn Score	Educ Score	Emp. Rate	Read or Write
Cleveland, OH	736,884	0.07	0.42	7305	0.26	0.48	0.65	0.60	46	25	52	13	0.78	0.96
Columbus, GA	34,395	0.28	0.23	6003	0.01	0.17	0.52	0.66	44	22	43	11	0.85	0.93
Columbus, OH	224,650	0.09	0.46	6597	0.05	0.52	0.62	0.59	43	26	54	16	0.82	0.99
Dallas, TX	182,283	0.11	0.42	6224	0.04	0.45	0.55	0.62	51	25	51	18	0.85	0.98
Dayton, OH	143,851	0.08	0.50	6285	0.06	0.58	0.62	0.60	50	26	53	15	0.83	0.99
Decatur, IL	47,825	0.03	0.56	5238	0.04	0.50	0.59	0.57	38	26	54	16	0.82	0.99
Dedham, MA	12,036	0.00	0.67	6588	0.23	0.63	0.64	0.58	60	25	53	16	0.85	0.98
Denver, CO	248,476	0.03	0.48	5421	0.11	0.53	0.63	0.58	41	26	52	19	0.81	0.99
Detroit, MI	1,058,107	0.05	0.49	8977	0.26	0.60	0.61	0.60	73	26	55	13	0.80	0.98
Duluth, MN	69,910	0.00	0.59	6155	0.23	0.53	0.67	0.57	31	26	53	17	0.77	0.99
Durham, NC	30,791	0.27	0.33	6097	0.01	0.22	0.53	0.67	36	24	47	13	0.85	0.95
East Hartford, CT	14,886	0.01	0.50	8098	0.18	0.62	0.61	0.60	33	26	53	14	0.82	0.97
East St. Louis, IL	58,444	0.17	0.45	4350	0.06	0.43	0.58	0.58	41	26	54	13	0.80	0.98
Elmira, NY	39,621	0.01	0.53	6523	0.09	0.47	0.66	0.58	38	26	54	16	0.79	0.98
Erie, PA	99,410	0.01	0.52	7731	0.15	0.51	0.61	0.56	85	26	53	14	0.83	0.97
Essex County, NJ	669,167	0.07	0.42	12616	0.22	0.66	0.63	0.60	51	26	53	17	0.82	0.97
Evansville, IN	75,901	0.06	0.46	4149	0.02	0.34	0.60	0.58	38	25	52	13	0.83	0.99
Everett, MA	43,906	0.02	0.44	6321	0.29	0.65	0.59	0.58	48	26	54	14	0.81	0.97
Flint, MI	102,596	0.02	0.64	5096	0.14	0.55	0.60	0.59	57	26	55	12	0.83	0.99
Fort Wayne, IN	93,848	0.02	0.60	6398	0.05	0.64	0.60	0.59	35	27	56	15	0.83	0.99
Fresno, CA	28,727	0.01	0.50	5075	0.21	0.38	0.67	0.56	37	26	51	19	0.79	0.96
Gary, IN	86,873	0.19	0.44	7264	0.21	0.46	0.62	0.59	62	25	54	12	0.88	0.95
Grand Rapids, MI	117,085	0.02	0.64	5689	0.16	0.50	0.65	0.57	45	26	54	16	0.78	0.98
Greensboro, NC	30,773	0.24	0.47	7648	0.01	0.32	0.56	0.62	36	24	48	17	0.85	0.97
Hamilton, OH	44,014	0.03	0.55	5140	0.04	0.51	0.54	0.57	35	26	55	12	0.84	0.98
Haverhill, MA	42,292	0.01	0.46	5423	0.22	0.51	0.64	0.62	47	25	48	12	0.76	0.97
Holyoke, MA	49,464	0.00	0.27	11802	0.29	0.52	0.68	0.61	34	25	51	13	0.80	0.97
Hudson County, NJ	507,548	0.03	0.29	9256	0.26	0.62	0.61	0.62	84	26	54	14	0.84	0.96
Indianapolis, IN	277,757	0.10	0.44	5881	0.04	0.49	0.59	0.60	63	26	53	16	0.83	0.99
Jacksonville, FL	84,535	0.31	0.35	6927	0.04	0.29	0.58	0.61	31	24	47	16	0.84	0.97

Table A1: City Characteristics, 1930

City	1930 Census Variables													
	Pop'n geo'd	Share AA	Home Own	House Values	Share FB	Radio Own	Att. School	Lab F Part.	Rent	Occ. Score	Earn Score	Educ Score	Emp. Rate	Read or Write
Johnson City, NY	11,678	0.00	0.54	6128	0.07	0.53	0.61	0.66	33	25	49	10	0.83	0.99
Johnstown, PA	52,542	0.02	0.45	6238	0.14	0.40	0.61	0.54	37	25	52	14	0.86	0.96
Joliet, IL	23,480	0.03	0.51	8027	0.16	0.60	0.62	0.57	44	26	55	17	0.82	0.99
Kalamazoo, MI	36,932	0.01	0.66	6181	0.11	0.58	0.66	0.57	45	26	54	18	0.83	1.00
Kansas City, MO	319,031	0.09	0.44	6600	0.07	0.52	0.64	0.61	52	26	52	17	0.85	0.99
Kenosha, WI	45,374	0.00	0.60	7686	0.24	0.63	0.68	0.58	46	25	53	12	0.78	0.96
Knoxville, TN	48,395	0.12	0.42	5279	0.01	0.29	0.56	0.60	42	26	52	16	0.83	0.97
Lexington, KY	35,158	0.27	0.37	6057	0.01	0.31	0.60	0.60	30	23	44	16	0.81	0.96
Lexington, MA	7,490	0.00	0.75	9028	0.20	0.75	0.64	0.55	215	25	50	19	0.87	0.98
Lima, OH	37,340	0.03	0.47	4914	0.04	0.47	0.62	0.58	43	26	55	15	0.84	0.99
Lorain, OH	39,324	0.02	0.62	5137	0.28	0.41	0.62	0.58	46	25	54	11	0.81	0.94
Louisville, KY	241,349	0.13	0.45	5459	0.03	0.37	0.57	0.59	57	25	51	15	0.82	0.98
Lynchburg, VA	31,821	0.23	0.47	5290	0.01	0.24	0.57	0.62	31	24	47	14	0.80	0.95
Macon, GA	18,559	0.34	0.28	4976	0.01	0.18	0.55	0.64	68	23	45	14	0.81	0.95
Madison, WI	51,536	0.00	0.56	8778	0.09	0.65	0.66	0.57	64	27	54	21	0.82	0.99
Malden, MA	53,282	0.01	0.47	6168	0.28	0.66	0.61	0.58	47	26	54	16	0.81	0.98
Manchester, NH	61,731	0.00	0.37	5502	0.29	0.41	0.62	0.64	53	25	49	12	0.79	0.97
Medford, MA	56,087	0.01	0.54	7536	0.23	0.73	0.60	0.57	59	27	56	17	0.84	0.98
Melrose, MA	19,787	0.00	0.67	7033	0.17	0.78	0.65	0.54	65	27	57	22	0.84	1.00
Miami, FL	69,057	0.19	0.35	5993	0.12	0.27	0.58	0.61	60	24	48	17	0.75	0.97
Milton, MA	12,285	0.00	0.69	12359	0.21	0.81	0.68	0.56	50	25	51	21	0.85	1.00
Milwaukee, WI	242,173	0.02	0.46	6719	0.20	0.65	0.66	0.59	52	26	55	14	0.83	0.98
Minneapolis, MN	363,688	0.01	0.51	6070	0.17	0.62	0.67	0.59	53	26	53	18	0.83	0.99
Mobile, AL	47,529	0.33	0.41	4997	0.03	0.22	0.56	0.60	48	23	46	14	0.84	0.94
Montgomery, AL	26,798	0.32	0.33	6288	0.02	0.24	0.57	0.63	29	23	46	16	0.86	0.93
Muncie, IN	34,855	0.06	0.51	4314	0.01	0.47	0.57	0.56	31	26	54	14	0.82	0.99
Muskegon, MI	28,208	0.01	0.61	4640	0.14	0.55	0.66	0.59	43	26	54	15	0.79	0.99
Needham, MA	6,709	0.00	0.73	10936	0.20	0.78	0.66	0.54	63	27	55	22	0.85	0.98
New Britain, CT	61,671	0.01	0.38	9356	0.31	0.41	0.64	0.61	36	26	54	13	0.83	0.92
New Castle, PA	41,741	0.02	0.60	5402	0.16	0.42	0.62	0.53	39	26	54	14	0.78	0.94

Table A1: City Characteristics, 1930

City	1930 Census Variables													
	Pop'n geo'd	Share AA	Home Own	House Values	Share FB	Radio Own	Att. School	Lab F Part.	Rent	Occ. Score	Earn Score	Educ Score	Emp. Rate	Read or Write
New Haven, CT	136,643	0.03	0.35	10769	0.25	0.55	0.64	0.60	45	26	53	16	0.81	0.96
New Orleans, LA	378,493	0.27	0.30	7107	0.04	0.23	0.58	0.60	48	23	47	14	0.81	0.95
New York, NY	1,420,354	0.11	0.04	42199	0.38	0.46	0.62	0.66	88	23	45	15	0.83	0.94
Newport News, VA	25,862	0.34	0.38	4028	0.04	0.33	0.55	0.60	27	26	55	14	0.90	0.96
Newton, MA	16,306	0.01	0.57	12314	0.25	0.69	0.67	0.58	95	25	49	18	0.82	0.98
Niagara Falls, NY	65,818	0.01	0.50	7505	0.33	0.59	0.65	0.59	43	26	55	14	0.84	0.95
Norfolk, VA	76,526	0.29	0.40	5795	0.04	0.38	0.60	0.60	38	25	50	17	0.84	0.96
Oakland, CA	218,891	0.03	0.53	6026	0.19	0.60	0.66	0.57	46	27	55	18	0.80	0.98
Oshkosh, WI	15,475	0.00	0.64	5568	0.12	0.57	0.67	0.55	45	25	51	16	0.79	0.99
Philadelphia, PA	1,623,342	0.11	0.55	6372	0.20	0.57	0.60	0.62	94	25	51	14	0.82	0.97
Pittsburgh, PA	518,768	0.07	0.46	8994	0.16	0.55	0.61	0.58	65	25	50	15	0.80	0.98
Pontiac, MI	47,428	0.04	0.54	6186	0.14	0.53	0.60	0.62	70	25	53	13	0.73	0.98
Portland, OR	42,912	0.01	0.49	5709	0.16	0.58	0.67	0.61	40	26	51	19	0.79	0.99
Portsmouth, OH	32,464	0.04	0.51	5353	0.02	0.40	0.58	0.57	35	26	55	14	0.83	0.98
Poughkeepsie, NY	34,674	0.03	0.39	9636	0.14	0.59	0.61	0.59	46	26	54	16	0.83	0.97
Queens, NY	837,973	0.02	0.51	9986	0.25	0.76	0.60	0.60	84	27	56	17	0.86	0.98
Quincy, MA	65,037	0.00	0.56	6658	0.25	0.72	0.59	0.58	44	27	58	18	0.86	0.98
Racine, WI	58,532	0.01	0.60	7300	0.21	0.69	0.68	0.58	59	26	56	14	0.83	0.98
Revere, MA	32,016	0.00	0.46	5797	0.27	0.64	0.62	0.56	48	26	55	15	0.79	0.95
Richmond, VA	140,735	0.25	0.37	7659	0.02	0.39	0.60	0.61	48	25	50	16	0.84	0.97
Roanoke, VA	42,518	0.19	0.47	5681	0.01	0.28	0.58	0.58	34	24	50	12	0.84	0.97
Rochester, NY	284,366	0.01	0.58	8052	0.23	0.57	0.67	0.60	68	26	54	16	0.80	0.96
Rockford, IL	77,126	0.01	0.53	7600	0.22	0.62	0.61	0.60	92	26	55	14	0.81	0.98
Sacramento, CA	71,415	0.01	0.50	5698	0.16	0.56	0.66	0.59	40	26	53	18	0.80	0.97
Saginaw, MI	47,237	0.03	0.64	4296	0.15	0.56	0.63	0.57	37	26	54	15	0.78	0.98
San Diego, CA	117,541	0.02	0.49	6409	0.15	0.55	0.64	0.53	34	25	51	19	0.74	0.99
San Francisco, CA	485,501	0.01	0.39	8247	0.27	0.51	0.64	0.61	71	26	52	18	0.82	0.98
San Jose, CA	42,403	0.00	0.60	5193	0.18	0.58	0.69	0.53	47	25	51	18	0.74	0.95
Saugus, MA	12,578	0.01	0.75	4866	0.20	0.74	0.60	0.57	47	27	57	15	0.82	0.98
Schenectady, NY	65,710	0.01	0.51	8295	0.20	0.59	0.68	0.58	43	27	58	18	0.84	0.97

Table A1: City Characteristics, 1930

City	1930 Census Variables													
	Pop'n geo'd	Share AA	Home Own	House Values	Share FB	Radio Own	Att. School	Lab F Part.	Rent	Occ. Score	Earn Score	Educ Score	Emp. Rate	Read or Write
Seattle, WA	265,620	0.01	0.53	5422	0.21	0.55	0.67	0.59	47	26	54	18	0.82	0.99
Somerville, MA	93,503	0.00	0.36	7044	0.29	0.64	0.60	0.59	46	26	54	15	0.82	0.97
South Bend, IN	77,632	0.03	0.62	6006	0.14	0.52	0.60	0.60	71	26	53	14	0.76	0.98
Spokane, WA	70,583	0.01	0.62	3768	0.14	0.52	0.65	0.58	33	26	53	18	0.80	0.99
Springfield, IL	57,261	0.04	0.57	5425	0.09	0.50	0.62	0.60	45	25	52	15	0.78	0.98
Springfield, MO	41,132	0.02	0.52	4162	0.02	0.28	0.61	0.54	24	26	54	17	0.81	0.99
Springfield, OH	55,778	0.11	0.48	5413	0.03	0.56	0.62	0.58	50	26	54	14	0.81	0.99
St. Joseph, MO	61,335	0.05	0.43	4172	0.05	0.49	0.62	0.58	30	25	51	15	0.83	0.99
St. Louis, MO	665,880	0.08	0.36	7254	0.10	0.53	0.59	0.60	58	25	52	15	0.83	0.98
St. Petersburg, FL	30,831	0.17	0.49	6194	0.06	0.25	0.64	0.51	26	24	48	18	0.67	0.98
Stamford, CT	36,991	0.03	0.43	11729	0.27	0.62	0.60	0.60	62	25	52	14	0.84	0.95
Staten Island ,NY	132,112	0.02	0.56	8327	0.25	0.67	0.64	0.59	56	27	57	17	0.84	0.97
Stockton, CA	34,605	0.01	0.46	5334	0.17	0.53	0.67	0.59	35	26	52	18	0.79	0.98
Syracuse, NY	173,151	0.01	0.49	10068	0.17	0.57	0.66	0.59	49	27	55	17	0.80	0.97
Tacoma, WA	70,786	0.01	0.63	3500	0.19	0.52	0.64	0.57	61	26	53	16	0.81	0.99
Tampa, FL	66,802	0.16	0.40	4046	0.16	0.16	0.58	0.62	25	24	47	13	0.79	0.96
Terre Haute, IN	52,646	0.05	0.49	4345	0.05	0.44	0.67	0.56	39	26	53	16	0.75	0.99
Toledo, OH	250,820	0.04	0.53	6688	0.12	0.62	0.63	0.59	49	26	55	14	0.80	0.98
Troy, NY	58,090	0.01	0.40	6558	0.14	0.53	0.65	0.61	83	26	53	15	0.82	0.98
Utica, NY	82,770	0.00	0.48	7994	0.21	0.48	0.66	0.60	43	26	52	14	0.79	0.94
Waltham, MA	31,475	0.00	0.42	7830	0.27	0.65	0.62	0.60	53	26	53	14	0.83	0.98
Warren, OH	29,274	0.05	0.57	6080	0.16	0.48	0.63	0.57	49	26	56	14	0.83	0.97
Watertown, MA	31,759	0.00	0.46	9267	0.28	0.67	0.61	0.59	50	27	55	17	0.83	0.98
Wheeling, WV	45,311	0.03	0.46	7169	0.08	0.50	0.58	0.57	36	25	52	16	0.81	0.98
Wichita, KS	62,996	0.03	0.48	4726	0.02	0.40	0.65	0.57	38	26	53	18	0.83	0.99
Winchester, MA	11,489	0.02	0.69	11351	0.19	0.76	0.67	0.54	80	25	50	20	0.84	0.98
Winston-Salem, NC	44,493	0.31	0.38	8166	0.01	0.22	0.53	0.67	25	24	48	13	0.84	0.94
Winthrop, MA	14,977	0.00	0.55	8466	0.21	0.76	0.67	0.55	78	28	58	23	0.84	0.99
Youngstown, OH	136,985	0.07	0.57	6055	0.20	0.46	0.65	0.56	47	26	55	14	0.78	0.96

Table A2: Rates of Geocode Matching

	1910	1920	1930	1940
Share of population with a non-missing address	73%	72%	99%	82%
Share of population successfully geocoded	49%	50%	79%	62%
Share of non-missing addresses successfully geocoded	63%	68%	79%	74%

Table A3: Effects of D versus C Grade, Home Ownership

Sample Type	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	HOLC Neighborhoods		1/4 Mile D-C Boundaries				
Year	D-C	D-C	D-C	D-C	Grid C.F's	Triple Diff	Low PS D-C
1910	-0.124 (0.012)	-0.118 (0.01)	-0.052 (0.006)	-0.051 (0.006)	-0.043 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.008)
1920	-0.137 (0.011)	-0.128 (0.007)	-0.055 (0.006)	-0.055 (0.006)	-0.046 (0.006)	-0.013 (0.006)	-0.022 (0.007)
1930	-0.110 (0.012)	-0.101 (0.007)	-0.033 (0.005)	-0.032 (0.005)	-0.036 (0.006)	-- --	-0.010 (0.005)
1940	-0.105 (0.011)	-0.097 (0.007)	-0.034 (0.005)	-0.032 (0.005)	-0.024 (0.005)	-0.012 (0.005)	-0.015 (0.006)
1950	-0.136 (0.023)	-0.117 (0.009)	-0.039 (0.011)	-0.029 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.026 (0.013)	-0.029 (0.01)
1960	-0.141 (0.021)	-0.115 (0.009)	-0.041 (0.009)	-0.031 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.033 (0.012)	-0.034 (0.01)
1970	-0.120 (0.017)	-0.096 (0.009)	-0.035 (0.01)	-0.028 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.031 (0.012)	-0.028 (0.009)
1980	-0.112 (0.019)	-0.086 (0.009)	-0.050 (0.011)	-0.036 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.040 (0.013)	-0.034 (0.009)
1990	-0.076 (0.01)	-0.067 (0.006)	-0.016 (0.007)	-0.015 (0.007)	-0.020 (0.007)	0.000 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.008)
2000	-0.073 (0.01)	-0.065 (0.007)	-0.017 (0.007)	-0.018 (0.007)	-0.014 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.009)
2010	-0.072 (0.009)	-0.063 (0.007)	-0.020 (0.007)	-0.021 (0.008)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.014 (0.008)	-0.019 (0.011)
<i>Cities</i>	<i>148</i>	<i>148</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>97</i>
<i>Neighborhoods</i>	<i>3,522</i>	<i>3,554</i>	--	--	--	--	--
<i>Boundaries</i>	--	--	--	<i>1,133</i>	<i>4,214</i>	<i>5,347</i>	<i>567</i>
<i>N</i>	<i>27,786</i>	<i>27,786</i>	<i>16,663</i>	<i>16,663</i>	<i>61,305</i>	<i>77,968</i>	<i>8,510</i>
<i>R2</i>	<i>0.071</i>	<i>0.285</i>	<i>0.287</i>	<i>0.616</i>	<i>0.598</i>	<i>0.602</i>	<i>0.64</i>
<i>F.E.</i>	<i>None</i>	<i>City</i>	<i>City</i>	<i>Bound.</i>	<i>Bound.</i>	<i>Bound.</i>	<i>Bound.</i>

Notes: Table entries are from regressions that estimate the gaps between D and C rated neighborhoods in Home Ownership. See notes to Table 2.

Table A4: Effect of D versus C grade, Log House Values

Sample Type	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	HOLC Neighborhoods		1/4 Mile D-C Boundaries				
Year	D-C	D-C	D-C	D-C	Grid C.F's	Triple Diff	Low PS D-C
1910							
1920							
1930	-0.307 (0.051)	-0.283 (0.032)	-0.159 (0.011)	-0.161 (0.012)	-0.144 (0.019)	-- --	-0.054 (0.016)
1940	-0.355 (0.039)	-0.327 (0.026)	-0.166 (0.012)	-0.166 (0.013)	-0.060 (0.017)	-0.089 (0.02)	-0.095 (0.014)
1950	-0.341 (0.044)	-0.303 (0.031)	-0.202 (0.03)	-0.213 (0.028)	-0.001 (0.045)	-0.195 (0.057)	-0.151 (0.037)
1960	-0.239 (0.054)	-0.238 (0.028)	-0.156 (0.024)	-0.161 (0.022)	-0.006 (0.036)	-0.137 (0.052)	-0.108 (0.031)
1970	-0.394 (0.08)	-0.399 (0.117)	-0.230 (0.054)	-0.231 (0.057)	0.007 (0.05)	-0.220 (0.081)	-0.248 (0.089)
1980	-0.293 (0.033)	-0.293 (0.034)	-0.257 (0.042)	-0.272 (0.04)	0.038 (0.049)	-0.293 (0.081)	-0.220 (0.067)
1990	-0.191 (0.055)	-0.174 (0.025)	-0.088 (0.017)	-0.087 (0.017)	-0.022 (0.009)	-0.048 (0.025)	-0.065 (0.019)
2000	-0.169 (0.048)	-0.151 (0.021)	-0.083 (0.012)	-0.079 (0.013)	-0.031 (0.01)	-0.032 (0.022)	-0.040 (0.02)
2010	-0.112 (0.058)	-0.099 (0.026)	-0.024 (0.014)	-0.026 (0.013)	-0.016 (0.015)	0.007 (0.031)	0.003 (0.015)
<i>Cities</i>	<i>148</i>	<i>148</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>97</i>
<i>Neighborhoods</i>	<i>2,798</i>	<i>3,542</i>	--	--	--	--	--
<i>Boundaries</i>	--	--	--	<i>1,133</i>	<i>4,214</i>	<i>5,347</i>	<i>567</i>
<i>N</i>	<i>22,152</i>	<i>22,152</i>	<i>11,620</i>	<i>11,620</i>	<i>41,645</i>	<i>53,265</i>	<i>6,005</i>
<i>R2</i>	<i>0.195</i>	<i>0.564</i>	<i>0.505</i>	<i>0.625</i>	<i>0.622</i>	<i>0.623</i>	<i>0.614</i>
<i>F.E.</i>	<i>None</i>	<i>City</i>	<i>City</i>	<i>Bound.</i>	<i>Bound.</i>	<i>Bound.</i>	<i>Bound.</i>

Notes: Table entries are from regressions that estimate the gaps between D and C rated neighborhoods in Log House Values. See notes to Table 2.

Table A5: Effect of D versus C Grade, Log Monthly Contract Rents

Sample Type	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	HOLC Neighborhoods		1/4 Mile D-C Boundaries				
Year	D-C	D-C	D-C	D-C	Grid C.F's	Triple Diff	Low PS D-C
1910							
1920							
1930	-0.315 (0.03)	-0.286 (0.025)	-0.126 (0.01)	-0.128 (0.01)	-0.127 (0.019)	-- --	-0.050 (0.013)
1940	-0.285 (0.036)	-0.254 (0.028)	-0.110 (0.016)	-0.111 (0.016)	-0.044 (0.018)	-0.067 (0.022)	-0.040 (0.019)
1950	-0.291 (0.026)	-0.259 (0.028)	-0.170 (0.025)	-0.164 (0.024)	-0.051 (0.03)	-0.113 (0.044)	-0.132 (0.022)
1960	-0.284 (0.066)	-0.256 (0.052)	-0.112 (0.036)	-0.109 (0.036)	-0.060 (0.066)	-0.049 (0.096)	-0.095 (0.057)
1970	-0.228 (0.024)	-0.206 (0.02)	-0.107 (0.019)	-0.103 (0.017)	0.003 (0.024)	-0.106 (0.034)	-0.086 (0.017)
1980	-0.218 (0.031)	-0.201 (0.02)	-0.109 (0.022)	-0.110 (0.022)	0.030 (0.015)	-0.140 (0.033)	-0.064 (0.019)
1990	-0.180 (0.025)	-0.155 (0.011)	-0.072 (0.009)	-0.074 (0.008)	-0.015 (0.007)	-0.059 (0.02)	-0.054 (0.009)
2000	-0.140 (0.025)	-0.116 (0.011)	-0.060 (0.007)	-0.061 (0.008)	-0.013 (0.007)	-0.048 (0.019)	-0.055 (0.011)
2010	-0.090 (0.029)	-0.066 (0.013)	-0.034 (0.011)	-0.036 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.033 (0.023)	-0.032 (0.016)
<i>Cities</i>	<i>148</i>	<i>148</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>97</i>
<i>Neighborhoods</i>	<i>667</i>	<i>3,542</i>	<i>--</i>	<i>--</i>	<i>--</i>	<i>--</i>	<i>--</i>
<i>Boundaries</i>	<i>--</i>	<i>--</i>	<i>--</i>	<i>1,133</i>	<i>4,214</i>	<i>5,347</i>	<i>567</i>
<i>N</i>	<i>22,291</i>	<i>22,291</i>	<i>12,098</i>	<i>12,098</i>	<i>44,281</i>	<i>56,379</i>	<i>6,235</i>
<i>R2</i>	<i>0.188</i>	<i>0.424</i>	<i>0.425</i>	<i>0.53</i>	<i>0.54</i>	<i>0.538</i>	<i>0.533</i>
<i>F.E.</i>	<i>None</i>	<i>City</i>	<i>City</i>	<i>Bound.</i>	<i>Bound.</i>	<i>Bound.</i>	<i>Bound.</i>

Notes: Table entries are from regressions that estimate the gaps between D and C rated neighborhoods in Log Rents. See notes to Table 2.

Table A6: Summary Statistics of Cities Around the 40,000 Population Cutoff

Non-Redlined Cities

City	Mean Characteristics								
	1930 Pop'n	1930				1980			
		Share AA	Home Own	Log Rent	Log H Value	Share AA	Home Own	Log Rent	Log H Value
Baton Rouge, LA	30,729	0.35	0.38	5.54	10.83	0.36	0.54	6.33	11.90
Bellingham, WA	30,823	0.00	0.65	5.54	10.55	0.00	0.54	6.38	11.94
Hagerstown, MD	30,861	0.05	0.37	5.72	11.06	0.06	0.43	6.04	11.50
Fort Smith, AR	31,429	0.11	0.44	5.43	10.55	0.07	0.61	6.07	11.42
Pensacola, FL	31,579	0.31	0.36	5.02	10.55	0.34	0.66	6.10	11.53
Meridian, MS	31,954	0.37	0.40	4.84	10.40	0.37	0.60	5.72	11.36
Muskogee, OK	32,026	0.21	0.45	5.54	10.36	0.18	0.67	5.92	11.26
Watertown, NY	32,205	0.00	0.49	5.87	11.06	0.00	0.51	6.04	11.31
Moline, IL	32,236	0.01	0.53	5.76	11.06	0.01	0.65	6.38	11.83
Wilmington, NC	32,270	0.41	0.40	5.02	10.55	0.39	0.47	5.93	11.20
Tucson, AZ	32,506	0.03	0.40	5.94	10.95	0.04	0.60	6.39	11.85
Laredo, TX	32,618	0.00	0.45	4.33	9.45	0.00	0.60	5.84	11.27
Colorado Springs, CO	33,237	0.03	0.54	5.54	10.70	0.06	0.59	6.33	11.99
Sioux Falls, SD	33,362	0.00	0.47	5.94	10.95	0.00	0.60	6.31	11.80
Joplin, MO	33,454	0.01	0.55	5.31	10.14	0.02	0.64	5.93	11.17
Mansfield, OH	33,525	0.03	0.54	5.94	11.24	0.16	0.61	6.05	11.39
Paducah, KY	33,541	0.20	0.38	5.18	10.14	0.19	0.59	5.79	11.25
Santa Barbara, CA	33,613	0.02	0.44	6.01	11.24	0.02	0.42	6.70	12.81
Lewiston, ME	34,948	0.00	0.34	5.63	11.15	0.00	0.47	6.13	11.58
Zanesville, OH	36,440	0.05	0.56	5.54	10.70	0.10	0.59	5.93	11.17
Hazleton, PA	36,765	0.00	0.44	5.94	11.06	0.00	0.61	5.96	11.16
San Bernardino, CA	37,481	0.01	0.53	5.76	10.83	0.15	0.59	6.30	11.89
Rock Island, IL	37,953	0.02	0.52	5.87	11.00	0.15	0.63	6.19	11.73
Quincy, IL	39,241	0.03	0.52	5.54	10.83	0.04	0.65	5.96	11.49
Butte, MT	39,532	0.00	0.40	5.76	10.14				
La Crosse, WI	39,614	0.00	0.55	5.63	10.78	0.00	0.55	6.23	11.72
<i>Mean</i>		0.09	0.46	5.54	10.70	0.11	0.58	6.12	11.58

Table A6: Summary Statistics of Cities Around the 40,000 Population Cutoff, cont.

Redlined Cities

City	Mean Characteristics								
	1930 Pop'n	1930				1980			
		Share AA	Home Own	Log Rent	Log H Value	Share AA	Home Own	Log Rent	Log H Value
Oshkosh, WI	40,108	0.00	0.68	5.76	10.83	0.01	0.61	6.15	11.60
Poughkeepsie, NY	40,288	0.03	0.37	5.94	11.59	0.26	0.38	6.22	11.63
St. Petersburg, FL	40,425	0.18	0.50	5.54	11.06	0.17	0.65	6.23	11.51
Lynchburg, VA	40,661	0.24	0.45	5.25	10.70	0.24	0.62	6.06	11.55
Warren, OH	41,062	0.06	0.54	6.10	11.15	0.18	0.62	6.09	11.50
Muskegon, MI	41,390	0.01	0.61	5.76	10.78	0.21	0.59	6.07	10.92
Lima, OH	42,287	0.03	0.46	5.63	10.83	0.20	0.62	6.04	11.33
Portsmouth, OH	42,560	0.04	0.46	5.63	11.06	0.05	0.60	5.84	11.23
Joliet, IL	42,993	0.03	0.53	5.94	11.32	0.20	0.61	6.24	11.75
Columbus, GA	43,131	0.33	0.24	5.02	10.83	0.34	0.57	5.90	11.36
Perth Amboy, NJ	43,516	0.02	0.41	5.87	11.39	0.08	0.44	6.37	11.66
Battle Creek, MI	43,573	0.04	0.58	5.94	11.06	0.23	0.59	6.15	10.96
Chicopee, MA	43,930	0.00	0.43	5.68	11.06	0.01	0.58	6.08	11.47
Lorain, OH	44,512	0.02	0.58	5.87	11.06	0.12	0.65	6.19	11.70
Jamestown, NY	45,155	0.01	0.54	5.76	11.24	0.03	0.55	5.97	11.26
Lexington, KY	45,736	0.29	0.36	5.54	10.95	0.13	0.53	6.34	11.87
Chelsea, MA	45,816	0.01	0.28	5.94	11.24	0.03	0.27	6.11	11.50
Stamford, CT	46,346	0.05	0.37	6.10	11.75	0.15	0.55	6.69	12.63
Muncie, IN	46,548	0.06	0.51	5.72	10.83	0.10	0.62	6.07	11.20
Aurora, IL	46,589	0.02	0.64	6.10	11.24	0.10	0.62	6.41	11.83
Bay City, MI	47,355	0.00	0.70	5.43	10.36	0.01	0.73	6.19	11.27
Elmira, NY	47,397	0.01	0.51	5.76	11.24	0.10	0.50	6.09	11.28
Brookline, MA	47,490	0.01	0.32	6.63	12.16	0.02	0.33	6.84	12.50
Stockton, CA	47,963	0.01	0.45	5.76	10.83	0.11	0.52	6.26	11.95
Everett, MA	48,424	0.02	0.40	6.01	11.24	0.02	0.41	6.21	11.84
Haverhill, MA	48,710	0.01	0.45	5.80	11.06	0.01	0.51	6.27	11.65
New Castle, PA	48,764	0.03	0.57	5.76	11.06	0.07	0.65	5.91	11.18
<i>Mean</i>		0.06	0.48	5.79	11.11	0.12	0.55	6.18	11.56

Table A7: Assessing HOLC Grading Criteria

Coefficients	(1) (2)		(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)				
	Ordered Logit								Probit			
	ABCD	ABCD							DC	DC	CB	CB
Share AA	2.824 (1.233)	1.510 (1.521)	2.742 (0.870)	2.093 (1.125)	-2.857 (1.146)	-3.531 (1.398)	-5.514 (1.262)	-10.147 (2.283)				
Share Home Own	-6.600 (0.594)	-7.590 (0.737)	-3.353 (0.428)	-4.523 (0.529)	-3.966 (0.485)	-4.818 (0.593)	-3.786 (0.565)	-3.857 (0.753)				
Log House Value	-3.057 (0.225)	-3.319 (0.268)	-1.570 (0.239)	-1.936 (0.218)	-1.474 (0.178)	-2.005 (0.189)	-1.598 (0.195)	-1.676 (0.281)				
Log Rent	-0.154 (0.080)	-0.163 (0.091)	-0.095 (0.060)	-0.071 (0.072)	-0.118 (0.061)	-0.145 (0.075)	0.064 (0.073)	0.035 (0.092)				
Occscore	-4.318 (1.166)	-6.012 (1.246)	-0.514 (1.091)	-2.231 (1.177)	-1.593 (0.968)	-3.875 (1.215)	-3.004 (1.055)	-2.971 (1.258)				
Employment	-0.139 (0.031)	-0.148 (0.038)	-0.143 (0.041)	-0.203 (0.049)	-0.132 (0.022)	-0.170 (0.037)	0.030 (0.023)	0.051 (0.030)				
Radio	-6.665 (0.753)	-7.163 (0.910)	-3.812 (0.530)	-2.894 (0.576)	-3.809 (0.622)	-4.260 (0.765)	-1.336 (0.766)	-2.214 (0.930)				
Literacy	-7.825 (2.349)	-10.676 (2.698)	-7.803 (1.802)	-10.726 (2.331)	-0.649 (3.618)	-0.888 (3.596)	-4.699 (3.834)	-4.003 (6.512)				
School Attendance	4.198 (0.811)	6.099 (1.192)	1.059 (0.729)	1.329 (0.947)	2.210 (0.661)	4.537 (1.014)	1.783 (0.721)	2.645 (1.202)				
Share Foreign Born	-0.332 (1.373)	-1.194 (1.757)	-2.548 (0.824)	-3.139 (0.968)	0.466 (1.023)	0.172 (1.139)	0.681 (1.298)	0.609 (1.832)				
Includes changes*	--	X	--	X	--	X	--	X				
Cities	147	146	138	137	144	142	120	102				
N	4,717	3,928	3,146	2,704	3,045	2,506	1,479	1,088				
Pseudo R ²	0.482	0.511	0.498	0.538	0.442	0.502	0.348	0.399				

Note: This table reports estimates of the relationship between HOLC map grades and 1930 neighborhood characteristics and 1920 to 1930 trends in characteristics. Each observation represents an HOLC neighborhood. In the ordered logit specification, the dependent variable is coded such that the neighborhood graded as riskiest has the highest value (e.g. the dependent variable is coded as D=4, C=3, B=2, and D=1). All specifications include city fixed effects and are weighted by the log of the population of the HOLC neighborhood in 1930. City-clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Table A8: Counts of Boundaries, by City

City	C-B	D-C
Akron, OH	62	28
Albany, NY	6	3
Altoona, PA	14	7
Arlington, MA	6	4
Asheville, NC	11	18
Atlanta, GA	13	1
Augusta, GA	1	4
Aurora, IL	12	13
Baltimore, MD	19	15
Battle Creek, MI	6	14
Bay City, MI	1	19
Belmont, MA	1	0
Binghamton, NY	11	2
Birmingham, AL	19	71
Boston, MA	6	22
Braintree, MA	3	0
Bronx, NY	8	17
Brookline, MA	4	0
Brooklyn, NY	44	73
Buffalo, NY	18	6
Cambridge, MA	4	8
Camden, NJ	8	3
Canton, OH	15	9
Charleston, WV	5	3
Charlotte, NC	1	3
Chattanooga, TN	8	14
Chelsea, MA		5
Chicago, IL	118	117
Chicopee, MA	2	0
Cleveland, OH	42	62
Columbus, GA	1	7
Columbus, OH	58	41
Dallas, TX	14	4
Dayton, OH	17	17
Decatur, IL	18	16
Dedham, MA	4	2
Denver, CO	33	24
Detroit, MI	41	109
Duluth, MN	16	3
Durham, NC	5	6
East Hartford, CT	2	2

Table A8: Counts of Boundaries, by City, cont.

City	C-B	D-C
Muncie, IN	1	6
Muskegon, MI	4	8
Needham, MA	3	0
New Britain, CT	6	0
New Castle, PA	8	4
New Haven, CT	4	11
New Orleans, LA	24	53
New York, NY	10	5
Newton, MA	3	3
Niagara Falls, NY	11	5
Norfolk, VA	6	5
Oakland, CA	23	23
Oshkosh, WI		11
Philadelphia, PA	58	53
Pittsburgh, PA	25	28
Pontiac, MI	5	3
Portland, OR	71	39
Portsmouth, OH	2	7
Poughkeepsie, NY	1	3
Queens, NY	35	27
Quincy, MA	5	0
Racine, WI	9	8
Revere, MA	0	3
Richmond, VA	5	5
Roanoke, VA	0	5
Rochester, NY	25	21
Rockford, IL	10	20
Sacramento, CA	12	0
Saginaw, MI	9	11
San Diego, CA	30	15
San Francisco, CA	13	25
San Jose, CA	15	13
Saugus, MA	3	5
Schenectady, NY	9	5
Seattle, WA	68	26
Somerville, MA	4	6
South Bend, IN	11	9
Spokane, WA	29	37
Springfield, IL	24	28
St. Joseph, MO	4	6
St. Louis, MO	51	31

Table A8: Counts of Boundaries, by City, cont.

City	C-B	D-C
St. Petersburg, FL	12	20
Stamford, CT	0	2
Staten Island ,NY	17	20
Stockton, CA	4	1
Syracuse, NY	18	8
Tacoma, WA	22	28
Tampa, FL	10	6
Terre Haute, IN	6	25
Toledo, OH	31	21
Troy, NY	9	8
Utica, NY	7	9
Waltham, MA	3	2
Warren, OH	9	4
Watertown, MA	4	0
Wheeling, WV	1	2
Wichita, KS	7	22
Winchester, MA	1	0
Winston-Salem, NC	3	4
Winthrop, MA	2	0
Youngstown, OH	25	31
<i>Total</i>	<i>1965</i>	<i>2111</i>

Table A9: City Level Average Estimates, 1950 to 1980

City	African American Share		Home Ownership Share		Log House Value		Log Rent	
	D-C	C-B	D-C	C-B	D-C	C-B	D-C	C-B
Akron, OH	0.22	0.56	-0.08	-0.02	-0.20	0.01	0.09	-0.20
Arlington, MA		0.01		0.14		-1.11		-0.92
Baltimore, MD	0.13		-0.13		-0.24		-0.13	
Bay City, MI	0.03		-0.30		0.06		0.03	
Binghamton, NY		0.01		-0.35		-0.31		-0.12
Birmingham, AL	0.43	-0.49	-0.16	0.20	0.97	0.52	-0.41	-0.08
Boston, MA	0.14		-0.03		-0.18		-0.08	
Bronx, NY	0.12	0.02	0.00	0.04	-0.30	-0.43	-0.17	-0.08
Brooklyn, NY	0.04	0.06	-0.01	-0.06	-0.22	-0.16	-0.06	-0.08
Buffalo, NY		0.14		-0.07		-0.47		-0.37
Cambridge, MA	0.16		0.03		-0.35		-0.36	
Chicago, IL	0.03	0.01	-0.03	-0.09	-0.13	-0.20	-0.09	-0.08
Cleveland, OH	0.07	0.01	0.01	-0.28	-0.16	0.23	-0.08	-0.05
Columbus, OH	0.45	0.05	-0.17	-0.02	-0.19	-0.18	-0.22	-0.33
Dayton, OH	-0.05	0.03	-0.19	-0.27	-0.06	-0.22	-0.11	0.04
Decatur, IL	0.25		-0.09		-0.06		-0.48	
Denver, CO		0.00		-0.12		-0.72		-2.57
Detroit, MI	0.21		0.01		0.02		-0.03	
Duluth, MN		0.01		-0.30		0.03		-0.41
East St. Louis, IL	-0.04		-0.25		-1.04		-0.42	
Elmira, NY		0.02		-0.18		0.70		-0.28
Erie, PA	0.43	0.12	-0.07	-0.08	-0.09	-0.23	-0.02	-0.27
Evansville, IN	0.51		-0.18		-0.05		-0.48	
Fort Wayne, IN		0.02		-0.05		0.49		0.02
Grand Rapids, MI	0.07		-0.01		-0.33			
Hudson County, NJ	0.19	-0.06	-0.07	-0.04	-0.27	-0.14	-0.10	0.02
Indianapolis, IN	0.08	0.19	0.03	-0.16	-0.20	-0.20	-0.03	0.08
Kansas City, MO	-0.04		-0.06		-0.14		-0.11	
Lexington, KY	0.45		-0.04		0.59		-0.66	
Louisville, KY	-0.17		0.10		-0.39		0.02	
Malden, MA	0.01		-0.03		-0.46		-0.91	
Minneapolis, MN	0.01	-0.02	-0.08	-0.03	-0.14	-0.13	-0.19	-0.07
Mobile, AL	0.64		0.07		0.02		-0.39	
New Britain, CT		0.03		-0.46		-0.18		-0.20
New Haven, CT	0.22		-0.03		-0.89		-0.41	
New Orleans, LA	0.23	-0.12	-0.03	-0.07	-0.27	0.00	-0.20	-0.74
New York, NY	0.22	0.16	-0.01	-0.01	-0.52	-0.08	-0.25	-0.21
Niagara Falls, NY		0.00		0.18		0.88		-0.03
Oakland, CA	0.03	-0.02	0.08	-0.04	-0.11	-0.39	-0.06	-0.28
Philadelphia, PA	0.18	0.11	0.00	-0.15	-0.32	-0.25	-0.25	-0.08
Pittsburgh, PA	0.05	0.01	0.03	-0.16	-0.24	-0.36	-0.12	-0.05

Table A9: City Level Average Estimates, 1950 to 1980, cont.

City	African American Share		Home Ownership Share		Log House Value		Log Rent	
	<i>D-C</i>	<i>C-B</i>	<i>D-C</i>	<i>C-B</i>	<i>D-C</i>	<i>C-B</i>	<i>D-C</i>	<i>C-B</i>
Rochester, NY	0.08	0.03	-0.07	-0.07	-0.28	-0.14	-0.08	-0.02
Rockford, IL	0.12		-0.22		0.77		-0.08	
San Diego, CA		0.03		-0.24		-0.06		0.01
San Francisco, CA	0.30		-0.01		0.02		0.09	
Somerville, MA	0.00		-0.10		0.06		-0.04	
Spokane, WA		0.01		-0.04		-0.28		-0.17
St. Louis, MO	0.09	0.19	-0.05	0.05	-0.24	-0.29	-0.24	-0.25
Staten Island ,NY	0.08	0.07	-0.03	-0.18	-0.28	-0.61	-0.19	-0.44
Syracuse, NY		0.06		0.00		-0.17		-0.14
Toledo, OH	0.45		0.02		-0.06		-0.03	

Table A10: City Level Average Estimates, 1990 to 2010

City	African American Share		Home Ownership		Log House Value		Log Rent	
	D-C	C-B	D-C	C-B	D-C	C-B	D-C	C-B
Akron, OH	0.17	0.07	0.07	0.11	-0.10	-0.05	-0.06	-0.04
Altoona, PA	0.00	0.01	-0.10	-0.04	0.03	-0.11	0.03	-0.11
Arlington, MA		0.01		-0.04		-0.12		-0.07
Aurora, IL	0.00	0.03	0.06	-0.14	-0.04	-0.07	-0.04	-0.05
Baltimore, MD	0.02	-0.02	-0.04	0.04	-0.10	0.18	-0.11	-0.01
Battle Creek, MI	0.10		0.01		0.06		0.00	
Bay City, MI	0.01		0.01		-0.04		-0.09	
Binghamton, NY		-0.01		-0.09		0.09		-0.02
Birmingham, AL	0.09	0.09	-0.10	-0.12	-0.07	-0.17	-0.11	-0.12
Boston, MA	0.00	0.01	-0.07	-0.15	0.06	-0.02	-0.16	-0.16
Bronx, NY	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.07	-0.21	0.23	-0.10	0.02
Brooklyn, NY	0.03	0.01	-0.01	-0.07	-0.09	-0.13	-0.06	-0.02
Buffalo, NY	0.14	0.02	-0.14	0.05	-0.22	-0.38	-0.09	-0.08
Cambridge, MA	0.06		-0.03		-0.15		-0.24	
Camden, NJ		-0.16		-0.14		-0.25		-0.06
Chelsea, MA	-0.01		-0.08		0.00		-0.08	
Chicago, IL	-0.01	-0.02	0.02	-0.13	-0.04	-0.08	-0.02	-0.04
Cleveland, OH	0.01	0.03	-0.03	-0.20	-0.05	-0.34	-0.01	0.07
Columbus, OH	0.06	0.03	0.02	-0.08	-0.15	0.02	-0.03	-0.08
Dayton, OH	0.02	-0.06	-0.06	-0.20	-0.10	-0.07	-0.15	0.12
Decatur, IL	0.13	0.08	-0.02	-0.09	-0.05	-0.10	0.00	0.03
Denver, CO	0.00	0.00	-0.12	-0.13	-0.08	-0.10	-0.08	-0.07
Detroit, MI	0.03		-0.04		-0.23		-0.11	
Duluth, MN		0.01		-0.05		-0.10		-0.01
East St. Louis, IL	-0.03		0.00		0.08		-0.16	
Elmira, NY	-0.03	0.02	0.16	-0.05	0.10	-0.18	-0.07	-0.06
Erie, PA	0.11	0.07	0.06	-0.06	-0.01	-0.15	-0.02	-0.09
Evansville, IN	0.12		0.00		-0.02		-0.12	
Everett, MA	0.02		0.04		-0.02		-0.02	
Fort Wayne, IN	0.15	0.01	-0.13	-0.15	-0.33	-0.10	-0.19	0.00
Grand Rapids, MI	0.17		0.05		-0.39		-0.01	
Hamilton, OH		0.00		-0.13		-0.10		-0.05
Hudson County, NJ	0.04	0.02	-0.04	-0.05	-0.14	-0.11	-0.11	-0.06
Indianapolis, IN	0.02	0.06	-0.01	-0.01	-0.10	-0.27	-0.03	-0.13
Jacksonville, FL	0.10		0.17		-0.02		-0.04	
Joliet, IL		0.01		-0.01		-0.05		-0.03
Kansas City, MO	-0.03		-0.01		-0.06		-0.04	
Knoxville, TN	0.05		-0.11		-0.15		-0.01	
Lexington, KY	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03	-0.10	0.01	0.02
Lima, OH	0.04		-0.06		0.00		-0.01	
Louisville, KY	-0.02	0.03	-0.01	0.00	-0.14	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01

Table A10: City Level Average Estimates, 1990 to 2010, cont.

City	African American Share		Home Ownership		Log House Value		Log Rent	
	D-C	C-B	D-C	C-B	D-C	C-B	D-C	C-B
Malden, MA	0.01		-0.06		0.00		-0.01	
Manchester, NH	0.01		-0.03		-0.09		0.00	
Melrose, MA		0.01		-0.15		-0.08		-0.17
Minneapolis, MN	0.01	0.04	0.05	-0.08	0.03	-0.07	-0.05	-0.03
Mobile, AL	0.05		-0.16		0.02		-0.15	
Muncie, IN	0.11		-0.26		-0.06		-0.27	
New Britain, CT		0.02		-0.09		-0.07		-0.08
New Haven, CT	0.13		-0.01		-0.11		-0.23	
New Orleans, LA	0.22	0.33	-0.07	-0.14	-0.27	-0.50	-0.13	-0.25
New York, NY	0.08	0.09	-0.02	-0.05	-0.14	-0.13	-0.04	-0.25
Niagara Falls, NY		-0.05		0.00		-0.03		-0.14
Oakland, CA	0.05	0.05	-0.01	-0.12	-0.04	-0.16	-0.07	-0.12
Oshkosh, WI	0.00		-0.08		-0.08		-0.04	
Philadelphia, PA	0.07	0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.14	-0.17	-0.07	-0.05
Pittsburgh, PA	0.08	0.04	-0.01	-0.03	-0.15	-0.21	-0.04	-0.06
Portland, OR	-0.03		0.00		0.05		0.00	
Quincy, MA		0.01		-0.06		0.05		0.03
Roanoke, VA	-0.03		-0.03		-0.10		-0.02	
Rochester, NY	0.04	0.07	0.01	-0.15	-0.07	-0.15	-0.04	-0.04
Rockford, IL	0.02	0.03	-0.05	-0.05	0.03	-0.07	-0.05	-0.03
Saginaw, MI	-0.09		0.09		-0.08		-0.04	
San Diego, CA		0.02		-0.09		-0.05		-0.06
San Francisco, CA	0.02	0.04	-0.02	-0.20	-0.01	-0.27	-0.02	-0.07
San Jose, CA	0.01		-0.06		-0.07		-0.09	
Schenectady, NY		0.03		-0.10		-0.09		-0.05
Seattle, WA		0.03		-0.20		-0.27		-0.20
Somerville, MA	0.03		-0.03		-0.11		-0.06	
Spokane, WA		0.00		-0.17		0.06		-0.05
Springfield, IL	0.10	0.07	-0.04	-0.13	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02
St. Joseph, MO	-0.01		0.02		0.00		0.00	
St. Louis, MO	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.03	-0.06	-0.24	-0.03	-0.07
Staten Island ,NY	-0.02	0.02	-0.13	-0.10	-0.05	-0.19	0.01	0.00
Syracuse, NY	0.09	0.05	-0.08	-0.05	0.05	-0.07	-0.08	-0.03
Tacoma, WA	-0.03	0.00	0.02	-0.01	0.06	-0.04	0.01	-0.06
Terre Haute, IN	0.08		0.00		-0.04		-0.01	
Toledo, OH	0.22	-0.08	0.01	-0.06	0.01	-0.04	-0.10	-0.01
Troy, NY	0.08	0.03	0.01	-0.21	-0.23	-0.08	0.00	-0.02
Wichita, KS	0.01		-0.06		-0.10		-0.03	
Youngstown, OH	-0.05	0.13	-0.04	0.09	-0.10	-0.08	-0.08	-0.26

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